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DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE 1993-94 TERM
JoeIBakan,BruceRyde~
David Schneiderman and Margot Young*
[The principles of fundamental justice are those] upon which there is some consen-
sus that they are vital Dr fundamental to our societal notion ofjustice....
[They] cannot be created for the occasion to reflect the court's dislike Dr distaste of
a particular statute.... IRleference must be made to principles which are "fundamen-
tal" in the sense that they would have general acceptance among reasonable people.
SopinkaJ.'
The best solution [to interpretive problems under the Charter] lies in seeking the
dominant views being expressed in society at large on the question in issue.
McLachlin J.2
1. INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of constitutional judicial review has been of con-
stant concern to the Supreme Court of Canada and those who ana-
lyze its work. Judges are neither democratically accountable nor
representative. Yet they possess the authority to deny force and
effect to the laws, policies and actions of elected officials; and the
only explicit constraints on their decisions are the often indetermi-
nate and vague provisions of the constitutional text. Sometimes
judges of the Court openly express anxiety about this, noting, for
example, that they must not question the wisdom of legislation in
reaching their decisions, while at other times they seek implicitly to
* Joel Bakan is Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia. Bruce Ryder is Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univer-
sity. David Schneiderman is Executive Director, Centre for Constitutional Studies,
University ofAlberta. Margot Young is Assistant Professor, Faculty ofLaw, University
of Victoria. Many thanks to Annie Bunting, Marlee Kline, Hester Lessard and Pra-
tima Rao for their helpful comments and support, and to Patrick Macklem for his con-
tribution to the organizing ideas. .
. I RodrigUli!z u. British Columbia (Attorney GeneralJ, 11993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 590
and 607.
2 McLachlin, "The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary" (1991), 29 Alta. L.
Rev. 540 at 546-47.
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assuage concerns about legitimacy by creating interpretive formulae
- like the Oakes3 test, double aspect doctrine, or purposive reason-
ing - that appear to constrain their discretion. A theme underlying
all of their efforts, however, is a desire not to step outside the bound-
aries of what they perceive to be the "social consensus" or "dominant
views" in Canadian society. That is the point of the above passages
from Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. The Court as a whole "labors under
the obligation to succeed", to borrow a phrase from Alexander
BickeI,4 and that means not moving too far ahead, or lagging too far
behind, what it perceives to be the social consensus. One of the diffi-
culties with such an approach is that there likely exists no social con-
sensus on most controversial issues, only different interpretations of
what it might be.6
The following analyses will draw out of this Term's cases four dif-
ferent, and often conflicting, themes that inform the Court's constitu-
tional decisionmaking. Each theme expresses a: conception of the
Canadian state, and taken together they represent, arguably, the
current range of dominant views regarding the appropriate role of
the state in Canada. Explicit and implicit reliance upon these con-
ceptions of the state can be understood as reflecting the Court's con-
cern to stay in step with its perception of contemporary social
consensus on the large political issue lurking behind every constitu-
tional question it addresses: How should the state exercise its power
and what sorts of constraints ought the Constitution impose upon
such state power?6 The fact that four different and potentially con-
flicting themes are developed in answer to this question suggests
that the members of the Court have not been able to identify what
the social consensus is; or, far more likely, a social consensus does not
exist on the desirable scope and content of state power, only compet-
ing ideals. In mapping out reflections of the four themes in this
Term's decisions, we hope to illustrate that constitutional adjudica-
tion is an inevitably political process, one shot through with contro-
versial presumptions about the state and contradictory approaches
to what results those presumptions require in particular cases. The
3 R. v. Oakes, 119861 1 S.C.R. 103.
• The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd
ed. 1986), at 239.
• "There is no consensus to he discovered," according to John Hart Ely, "and to
the extent that one may seem to exist, that is likely to reflect only the domination of
some groups by others." See Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980), at 63.
, A similar kind of analysis can he found in Macklem, "Constitutional Ideolo-
gies" (1988), 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117.
four themes we will look at are classical liberalism, federalism,
social democracy and neo-liberalism. Before turning to the cases, a
quick synopsis of each of these themes may be useful.
The classical liberal state is constructed as fundamentally antago-
nistic to individual interests. As representative of the all-powerful
collectivity, the state always operates in potentially hostile opposi-
tion to individual interests. This coercive capacity of the state must
be kept in check - one checking mechanism being judicial review.
Moreover, since the state rather than private power is conceived as
the major threat to individual liberty, state powers of economic regu-
lation should be limited to establishing the preconditions of a com-
petitive marketplace. State interference in the outcome of private
market ordering is presumptively illegitimate. The antagonism
between individual and state, representative of classical liberalism,
is reinforced by other structural oppositions, such as those between
freedom and restraint, and the public and private spheres.
The federal conception of the state assumes a tension between the
national and the sub-national; between local communities of loyalty
organized along provincial lines and a national community premised
upon the notion of a single citizenship and a single national market.
Here the state's jurisdiction is divided between two levels of govern-
ment, although power is considered to be complete: as between these
levels, there is nothing beyond jurisdictional competence. Under the
federal conception of the state, judicial review is usually considered
to be essentially neutral as to the proper role of the state within the
constraints of the federal form. The purpose of judicial review is to
maintain a balance of provincial and federal powers when allocating
particular legislative functions to either, or both, levels ofthe state.
The social democratic conception concedes that the state has a
proper role to play, both as facilitator of, and as corrective to, the pri-
vate marketplace. The social democratic approach comprehends that
the state is implicated extensively in the operation of the private
sphere so revered by the classical liberal conception. The role of the
social democratic state is to intervene self-consciously on behalf of
"vulnerable groups" and to redress the inequalities of power that
predominate in society.
The neo-liberal conception of the state may be considered the
more recent ofthe conceptions of the state. In the neo-liberal frame,
the state (particularly its social-democratic variant) is considered
obsolete. Due to the organization of production across state borders,
the state is no longer relevant to the economic life of its citizenry. 'Ib
be sure, there are still some functions the state is needed to fulfill -
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crime control and national defence, to name only a couple - but, for
the most part, the state is best removed from economic life in the
name of productivity and global competitiveness.
II. THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL STATE
The first of the conceptions of the state one can draw out of the
constitutional cases of the 1993-94 Supreme Court Term is perhaps
the most obvious one. Given the ideological heritage of rights protec-
tion, its roots in a Lockean preoccupation with the unbridled exercise
of state power and the alleged danger such central authority poses
for individual freedom and autonomy, one would expect a classical
liberal picture ofthe state to figure in any discussion of rights within
liberal democracies.7 Equally, the picture of state authority implicit
in such a perspective - one that relies on notions offormal equality,
the respect for consent as justification for coercion, and the enshrine-
ment of a sphere of private or local autonomy - is a strong part of
the political history of Canadian federalism and is thus an expected
undercurrent in most discussions of federal and provincial jurisdic-
tion. In both areas one finds judges implicitly relying on an image of
the state whose actions are best understood as negative and repres-
sive of individual freedom and whose entry into classically private
spheres - the economy, the family - is either illegitimate or must
be justified. Such a conception of state power flows from the assump-
tion of a relationship of antagonism but necessary connection
between individual freedom and collective power.8 State power, rep-
resentative as it is of collective power, necessarily involves coercive
restructuring of at least some expressions of individual choice. Cast
in opposition are individual freedom and state authority, the former
to be revered and the latter tolerated but limited.
1. The PubliclPrivate Distinction
Various methods for mediating and understanding the tension
between the individual and the state exist within classical liberal
theory. One old standard, long the flogging horse of the left, is the
assertion of a distinction between private and public spheres of life.
7 Waldron, "Natural Rights in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" in
Waldron (00.), Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights ofMan
(1991).
• Schwartz, "Individuals, Groups and Canadian Statecraft" in Devlin (ed.),
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (1991), at 39.
As Hester Lessard writes, the public sphere consists of the formal
apparatus of the state, cloaked in its full regulatory and punitive
power. The private sphere is the realm of the family, the market,
the personal, and the customary. It is "the sphere of activity that
facilitates individual and social well-being."9 Social ordering as it
appears in the private sphere is the product of the free pursuit of
individual interests, the mix of individual talents and choices. The
state figures in the evolution of such relations only narrowly as
mediator of disputes. 10 To the extent that the state does more than
this, it loses authority. Thus, the public and private spheres are
distinguished in terms of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particu-
lar types of state intervention in each. ll The public sphere marks
out those areas of collective and individual life in which state
ordering is legitimate, while the private sphere identifies a realm
of protected individual action too intimate and essential to individ-
ual personality to permit state or collective structuring. In only
such a manner, it is argued, is the moral primacy of individual free-
dom respected, the pursuit of important individual preference pre-
served, and the necessity of some collective ordering acknowledged
and legitimated.
Imagery of public and private spheres of human activity is
involved most obviously in decisions involving the issue of the
application of the Charter. 12 Judicial review on constitutional
grounds stands in complicated relationship to liberalism's empha-
sis on individual freedom. Judicial assertion of rights as a means of
preventing state interference with individual choice is, from a clas-
sical liberal perspective, a positive event. However, when relied
upon to re-order the private sphere, rights, as statements of public
norms and values, threaten the very individual freedom mandating
their constitutional protection in the first place, no less than gov-
ernment intrusion into the same sphere. Thus, the theoretical bag-
gage of rights necessitates some sort of public/private divide
ensuring that "there is a private realm in which people are not
obliged to subscribe to 'state' virtues and into which constitutional
norms ought not to intrude."13 So, it is no surprise that the Charter,
from its earliest days on, has been held to constitute a check on
9 Lessard, "The Construction of Health Care and the Ideology of the Private in
Canadian Constitutional Law" (1993), 2 Annals of Health L. 121 at 132.
10 [d., at 132.
11 Mahoney, "The Limits of Liberalism" in Devlin (ed.), supra, note 7, at 61.
12 Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (Constitution Act, 1982, Pt. I).
" Hogg, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: The Application of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1987),51 Sask. L. Rev. 273 at 274.
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state action alone. A broader reach for the Charter would have
meant re-thinking fundamental liberal conceptions of social and
political ordering. 14
What initial confinement of the scope of Charter review did not
mean, however, was that subsequent application issues were ren-
dered simple. The incoherence of any imagined line between state .
and non-state activity in a modem administrative society has
ensured that the Court has been unable to provide clear, predictive
guidance as to what sorts of activities lie within the purview of the
Charter. 16 Most notable among the Court's founderings on this issue
is its early assertion in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union,
Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.16 that the Charter does not apply
to the judiciary, per se. It is not surprising, on reflection, that this is
where the Court drew the line. Courts are, after all, one obvious spot
where private disputes meet state power and thus dwell along the
boundary between public arid private. The concern that judicial
involvement alone not trigger Charter review is juxtaposed to the
potential threat to fundamental individual freedoms judicial power
might represent.
The developing saga of the judiciary and the Charter arose in an
unexpected way this Term in the case of Thung v. Young. 17 We say
unexpected because the conundrum after Dolphin Delivery appeared
to be the Charter's relevance to judicial reliance on common law, not
on legislation. In this case, challenge was made to the Divorce Act's
requirement that judicial custody and access orders be made "in the
best interests of the child",18 a test adopted from traditional common
law rules on custody and access issues. The claim was that this.
requirement infringed sections 2(a), 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter.
The dispute, occasioned by the breakdown of a couple's marriage,
focused on an initial order at trial granting access to the children by
the non-custodial parent on the conditions that he not discuss the
Jehovah's Witness religion with the children, take the children to
religious services or meetings, nor expose the children to religious
discussion without the custodial parent's permission. The order was
" See Hutchinson and Petter, "Private RightslPublic Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of
the Charter" (1988), 38 V.T. L.J. 278.
l' For a lengthier discussion ofthis point, see Bakan, "Constitutional Interpreta-
tion and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)"
(1991),70 Can. Bar Rev. 307.
16 (1986) 2 S.C.R 573.
11 [1993J 4 S.C.R 3.
18 RS.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), ss. 16(8), 17(5). Also at issue were the trial
judge's orders for distribution of property, payment of support and expenses, and for
costs. The orders were varied by the Supreme Court.
.r. modified upon first appeal, with limitations on religious discussion
and attendance set aside. In its turn, the Supreme Court allowed the
appeal in part. Aside from the question of applicability, the best
interests test was found not to violate the Charter. However, the
Court of Appeal's rejection of the trial judge's order imposing condi-
tions on the non-custodial parent's access was upheld. The Supreme
Court held that imposition of these conditions was not supported by
proper application of the best interests of the child test.
Thung presented a tough case for the Court. It brought together a
number of tricky elements for the classical liberal perspective under-
lying the Court's stance on application issues: a familial and there-
fore prototypically private dispute, state codification of a traditional
and discretionary common law test, and the judicial application of
this test in ways that at least prima facie raised issues of protected
individual freedoms. 1bgether, these factors signalled difficulty for a
court reluctant to grant wide applicability to the Charter but desir-
ous of constructing a vigorous network of constitutional protection.
Holding the judicial order in Thung subject to the Charter would
mean injecting a set of external values in that most sacred ofprivate
areas: the parent-child relationship. But to find the Charter inappli-
cable would be to distance oddly the resolution of the dispute by the
court from the mandatory statutory (state) framework. Thus, Thung
forces the Court to confront directly the soundness of the distinctions
it drew in Dolphin Delivery as they apply to the modem administra-
tive state, a state deeply implicated in the most intimate and private
aspects of its citizens' lives. In Young, this involvement, more invisi-
ble in other contexts, is conspicuous, crystallized as it is in the legis-
lative provisions.
Ofthose who wrote opinions, L'Heureux-DuM J. alone took up the
challenge of dealing with the application issue. She did so in a way
that bodes badly for the future coherence of application doctrine, but
that is perhaps more acceptable when viewed from the substantive
perspective offamily law principles. We will come to this last conten-
tion later, dealing first with the judgment's implications for Charter
application issues. Justice L'Heureux-Dube split the constitutional
issue into two questions: first, the constitutional status of the statu-
tory test and, second, the constitutionality of the judicial order under
such a test. This is a puzzling distinction, at least until one realizes
that such a split enabled respect for Dolphin Delivery's spirit of
restrained Charter review in the "private" realm while also dealing
with the obvious legislative context underlying the dispute. Unfortu-
nately, this juggling act is achieved at the high price of inserting into
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the doctrine the specious distinction between a legislative test and
the judicial order based on that test, something clearly out of line
with early jurisprudence.19
The first of L'Heureux-DuM J.'s questions - the legislative test -
raises no difficult application issue; legislative action clearly falls
within section 32 of the Charter.20 It is the second part ofthe constitu-
tional challenge - the character of the judicial order under this legis-
lative test - that raises the thornier application issue. Justice
L'Heureux-DuM began her discussion by purposively characterizing
religious and expressive rights as "public". What are we to understand
L'Heureux-DuM J. to mean by this? Justice L'Heureux-Dube provides
some direct insight into her characterization of these rights as "public"
when she writes that such rights guard against state coercion of the
individual; they speak only to the relationship between the individual
and state. They are therefore inappropriately applied in custody and
access disputes, since those disputes involve relationships between
family members and values other than those of individualism and
autonomy. According to L'Heureux-DuM J., these rights do not enable
an individual to "claim the protection of the state either to say or
refrain from saying something to a spouse or child",21 for custody and
access matters are of a different character than those matters that lie
between the individual and the state and that rights mediate. This is a
difference that remains unaltered despite the Divorce Act's involve-
ment: "[t]he mere fact that the state plays a role in custody and access
decisions in formalizing the circumstances of parent-Child interaction
does not transform the essentially private character of such inter-
changes into activity which should be subject to Charter scrutiny.,,22
Thus, the involvement of the Divorce Act clearly did not, for L'Heu-
reux-DuM J., change the dispute into a public one, despite the parties'
reliance on a statutory provision. It becomes apparent that what
" See the discussion of Blainey (approved in Dolphin) in text at note 24, infra.
See also Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (exercise of
discretion pursuant to statutory powers must comply with the Charter).
20 Justice L'Heureux-Dulle quickly dismissed challenges to the best interests leg-
islative standard itself. As to the content of the test, she stated that it was "self-evi-
dent that the best interests test is value neutral, and cannot be seen on its face to
violate any right protected by the Charter" (supra, note 17, at 71). She also found that
the test was not unduly vague nor did it grant overly broad discretion to the judiciary
(id., at 72). This resolution of these issues was mirrored by the Court's response in
P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, to a similar challenge to the child's best interests
test of art. 30 of the Civil Code ofLower Canada, [ad. 1980, c. 39, s. 31.
21 Supra, note 17, at 89-90. This, of course, adds the further dimension that such
rights are negative, not positive (although the relevance of this observation remains
unclear given that the protest is against state restriction ofreligious speech).
22 Id., at 90.
L'Heureux-Dube J. means by "public" rights here are precisely those
rights that conform with classical liberal rights: rights that adhere to
the individual and that preserve individual freedom in the private
sphere. And family disputes - at least those involving the custody of
and access to children - are not appropriately structured by such pri-
vate individual freedoms. So, L'Heureux-DuM J. concluded, the con-
stitutional concerns such rights might raise are to be dealt with only
in relation to the legislative test and not to the judicial custody and
access order made pursuant to it. The judicial order is rendered
immune from review on Charter grounds, in line, L'Heureux-DuM J.
asserted, with the ratio ofDolphin Delivery.23
What is interesting about this discussion is that L'Heureux-Dube
J. employs one sense of the distinction between public and private to
justify the further doctrinal entrenchment of another, different use
of the public/private split. The first set opposes the family as a pri-
vate sphere structured by its own norms (one suspects such things
as altruism and communal values) to the public sphere, a realm of
individualism, competition, and selfishness (values arguably linked
with the assertion of classical rights). This first public/private split
accounts for why freedom of religion and expression become "public"
rights, even though such freedoms, belonging as they do to individu-
als and guaranteeing as they do private liberty, are more coherently
seen as "private" rights from the other sense of public and private
where the divide lies between the individual and the state. It is this
slippage between the two different senses of the public/private that
enables L'Heureux-DuM J. to keep the Charter at bay.
From the perspective of doctrinal clarity, this decision is unfortu-
nate. As already mentioned, one is struck by the arbitrary nature of
distinguishing for constitutional review purposes a legislative test
and the judicial order relying on such a test. Equally puzzling is the
conclusion that legislative involvement in custody and access deci-
sions does not introduce an element of public regulation. Despite
L'Heureux-DuM J.'s obvious relief that she has been able to preserve
Dolphin Delivery's ratio as it pertains to constitutional review of the
judiciary, her decision runs counter to important aspects of that deci-
sion. One might reasonably have assumed that the situation in
Young closely mimicked the circumstances in Blainey v. Ontario
Hockey Association,24 a case cited with approval by the Court in Dol-
23 In a very similar case, released the same day, P.(D.) u. S. (C.), supra, note 20, at
181, L'Heureux-Dulle J. reached the same conclusion: "The Charter...will not apply
here to the order of a court in a family matter."
.. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 728 (C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 274n.
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phin Delivery for its application of the Charter to a dispute between
two private parties. In Blainey, the fact that one ofthe parties relied
upon a legislative provision was sufficient to provide the required
element of government intervention, thus removing the case from
the private sphere despite the fact that the legislation in question
merely encoded a pre-existing common law tolerance for certain
forms of discrimination. But this was clearly not how L'Heureux-
DuM J. dealt with similar legislative involvement in Thung. Instead,
because L'Heureux-DuM J. was able to find that there exists apart
from the statutory provisions an inherent judicial jurisdiction to
resolve custody and access disputes in favour of the best interests of
the child, the judicial order in Young was rendered immune from
Charter review.
However, from a broader political perspective, L'Heureux-DuM
J.'s decision in Young takes on both a more coherent and, arguably, a
more favourable aspect. A return to the discussion of the classical lib-
eral image of the state with which we began this section lends the
coherence. The insulation of parent-child interaction from Charter
review and the underlying refusal to see disputes in this area as any-
thing but private resonate soundly with liberal insistence that family
life lies at the core of the private. The reluctance to admit that the
state is meaningfully present, even here, reinforces that rigid picture
of the state as registering only a coercive presence and not, alterna-
tively, positively and intimately involved in most, ifnot all, aspects of
individual life. Certainly, L'Heureux-DuM J.'s judgment is not sim-
plistic in its invocation of these themes, but such reminders of the
classical liberalism which fuels the concern that there be a line
drawn between public and private actions seem rather apposite here.
It is also worth noting that rulings L'Heureux-DuM J. classifies as
exceptions to the rule in Dolphin Delivery - BCGEU, Slaight25 - in
fact fit in nicely with the notion that it is underlying ideological per-
spectives on what is public and private that determine the reach of
the Charter.
A more favourable view of L'Heureux-Dube J.'s insulation of this
area of family law from Charter review proceeds from a perspective
on Charter litigation generally suspicious of attempts to open up
family relations to the norms and values encoded within Charter
rights. Despite classical liberalism's insistence upon the neutrality of
rights protections - that rights, by constraining the state, facilitate
26 British Columbia Government Employees' Union u. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [19881 2 S.C.R. 214; and Slaight Communications 1m:. u. Davidson, supra,
note 19.
equally all individual life plans - one has only to recall the danger
that imposition of these same rights in the private sphere can repre-
sent for individual autonomy to appreciate that such rights are nei-
ther neutral nor apolitical. One sees clearly, from this reversed
perspective, that rights are "claims about the appropriate allocation
of state powers and social resources":26 that they always already
embody a particular substantive vision of justice. In effect, what
L'Heureux-DuM J. is saying is that this vision of justice ill fits the
area of family law under review: a point, it bears stating, that
numerous fe~ist family law commentators have already made.27
So, L'Heureux-Dube J. does use the rhetoric of classical liberalism, of
the private sphere necessitated by the repressive state of the classi-
cal liberal, but one suspects that what she is in fact achieving by way
of this rhetorical deployment is an insulation of important aspects of
communal life from the very individualism which justifies that rhet-
oric in the first place.
2. The Minimalist State
The Court's federalism jurisprudence also reflects a classical lib-
eral concern with state regulation of certain areas of social life. In
the classical liberal vision, for example, the state assumes a mini-
malist role in economic regulation, limited to establishing the pre-
conditions of a market economy and then interfering as little as
possible with the market's presumptively fair outcomes. This vision
tends to be enhanced by constitutional doctrines, such as the inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrine, that limit state powers of regula-
tion to the exclusive jurisdiction of one level of government.
Conversely, doctrines that promote de facto concurrency of legisla-
tive power, like the double aspect doctrine, expand the opportunities
for state intervention and are, for this reason, inimical to the classi-
cal liberal vision. The position the Court takes between exclusivity
and concurrency is thus a good indication of its attitude to state reg-
ulation in a particular context.28
Largely, although not exclusively, the Court's federalism decisions
26 Hutchinson and Petter, supra, note 14, at 289.
27 See, for example, Boyd, "Women, Men and Relationships With Children: Is
Equality Possible?" in Busby, Fainstein, and Penner (eds.), Equality Issues in Family
Law: Considerations for Test Case Litigation (1990); and Smart, Feminism and the
Power ofLaw (1989).
2. See Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Fed·
eralism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations· (1991), 36 McGill
L.J.308.
29 Reference re Quebec Sales Tax, [1994] 2 S.C.R 715 (transformation of Quebec
Sales Tax to a value-added tax to harmonize it with the federal goods and services tax:
upheld; general tendency of tax would be direct, and indirect elements created by
small supplier exemption found to be incidental to the efficient administration of the
tax); and Allard Contractors Ltd. u. Coquitlam (Distru,t), [1993] 4 S.C.R 371 (munici-
pal by-laws imposing volumetric fees as part of a licensing scheme dealing with
removal of gravel upheld; s. 92(9) of the Constitution Act, 1867 empowers provinces to
impose an element of indirect taxation through a licensing scheme provided revenue is
used to defray the costs of the regulatory scheme).
30 Ontario Hydro u. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993) 3 S.C.R 327.
31 R. u. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R 463..
32 R. u. Colarusso, (1994) 1 S.C.R 20.
33 Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia), (1991) 2 S.C.R 525;
British Columbia (Attorney General) u. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41,
discussed infra, note 56 et seq. and accompanying text.
in the 1993-94 Term evoke this classical liberal vision of the state. In
only two cases (concerning provincial taxation powers)29 was the
Court willing to promote a limited measure of concurrency. Other-
wise, the Court insisted upon a clear separation of federal and pro-
vincial powers. The Ontario Hydro30 case, for example, continues a
long Supreme Court tradition of ensuring that the regulation of the
relationship between any group of workers and an employer is com-
petent to only one level of government. Similarly, the MorgentalerS1
and Colarusso32 cases rely on federal criminal law jurisdiction to
limit the use of the coercive power of the state for punitive purposes
to one level of government.
As mentioned, in Allard and Reference re QST the Court did
countenance a measure of concurrent provincial power in relation
to indirect taxation. Given the fiscal problems currently faced by
all levels of government, it is perhaps predictable that the Court
was unwilling to construe narrowly provincial powers to raise rev-
enue. One implication of federal cost cutting (and the fact that the
Court has given its seal of approval to unilateral reductions in fed-
eral spending in areas of provincial jurisdiction)33 is that the prov-
inces will be increasingly dependent on their own sources of
revenue in the years ahead. Narrow interpretations of provincial
taxation powers would open the Court to the charge that it is con-
tributing to a situation that places the provinces in a fiscal strait-
jacket.
More typical of this Term was the Court's approach to the regula-
tion of labour relations, an approach that closes the door completely
on any possibility of concurrent federal and provincial powers in rela-
tion to the same employees. In Ontario Hydro, the Court was asked
to review the refusal of the Ontario Labour Relations Board to certify
a proposed union of employees at Ontario Hydro on the grounds that
34 RS.a. 1990, c. L.2.
35 RS.C. 1985, c. L-2.
3. Enacted as the British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), c. 3 [see RS.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 51.
37 Supra, note 30, at 351, per Lamer C.J., and 367, 380, per La ForestJ.
38 Id., at 363.
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some of the employees worked at nuclear generating facilities that
fell within federal legislative jurisdiction. Following the traditional
"either/or" approach of its labour relations jurisprudence, the Court
framed the issue as whether the Ontario Labour Relations Act34 or
the Canada Labour Codes5 applied to the labour relations of the dis-
puted employees.
The possibility that both pieces of legislation could be applicable,
allowing workers to choose to seek certification under whichever
statute appeared to them to be the most favourable, was not raised.
This was so niltwithstanding the presence of strong claims to juris-
diction by both the federal and provincial governments. The prov-
ince, for instance, had a strong textual basis to support its claim to
jurisdiction: section 92A(1)(c) of the Constitution Act, 186';36 confers
on the provinces exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws in relation to the
"management of sites and facilities in the province for the genera-
tion and production of electrical energy."
The majority judgments of La Forest J. (Gonthier and L'Heu-
reux-DuM JJ. concurring) and Lamer C.J. found that jurisdiction
in relation to labour relations is "integral" to Parliament's declara-
tory power in section 92(10)(c) and the national dimensions branch
of the peace, order, and good government power.37 As a- result, the
Canada Labour Code could apply to Ontario Hydro's employees at
nuclear generating facilities. Moreover, it followed, in the major-
ity's view, that the Ontario Labour Relations Act could not apply to
the same employees since, in La Forest J.'s words, "[l]aws of gen-
eral application in the province...cannot touch an integral part of
Parliament's jurisdiction over the work."38 The majority thus
invoked the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to "read down"
the provincial statute.
The interjurisdictional immunity doctrine has a deregulatory
thrust, one that has been embraced warmly by the Supreme Court
in recent years. The effect of the doctrine is to -remove the possibil-
ity of any concurrent provincial jurisdiction in relation to matters
that are found to be "integral" to federal jurisdiction. From its mod-
est roots in the "federal companies cases", the doctrine has
expanded to prevent otherwise valid provincial laws from touching
I
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matters that are determined to be integral to a wide array of fed-
eral powers.39 The imperialistic spread of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine has had its greatest impact in restricting the
scope for state intervention in the employment relationship. Labour
relations, apparently, is always "integral" to federal jurisdiction
over a work or undertaking and thus provincial labour laws are
always ousted by invoking the doctrine.
The dissenting judgment of Iacobucci J. (Sopinka and Cory JJ.
concurring) departed from the view that labour relations is neces-
sarily integral to federal jurisdiction over an undertaking. His judg-
ment, however, still is consistent with the Court's tradition of
viewing labour relations jurisdiction as an "either/or" proposition.
In Iacobucci J.'s view, jurisdiction over the labour relations of
employees at nuclear electrical generating facilities is "integral" to
provincial jurisdiction over the management of those facilities pur-
suant to section 92A(1)(c), but is not "integral" to federal jurisdic~
tion pursuant to its declaratory or pogg powers. It followed,
therefore, that "it is the Ontario Labour Relations Act which consti-
tutionally applies" to those employees.4o Neither the dissenters nor
the majority judges were willing to contemplate the obvious possi-
bility that the regulation of the labour relations of employees at
nuclear generating stations is equally important to both federal and
provincial powers and thus ought to be a "double aspect" matter
subject to concurrent jurisdiction. In this way, the Ontario Hydro
decision continues a long Supreme Court tradition of limiting the
opportunities for the state to engage in regulation of the employ-
ment relationship.
The Court's decision in R. v. Morgentaler41 endorsed a related
aspect of the classical liberal conception of the state, namely the view
that the state is a potentially powerful antagonist of the individual.
In Morgentaler, as in the recent Starr v. Houlden42 decision, the
Court used the federal criminal law power to restrict interference
.. See Beetz J.'s review of the cases and strong defence of the doctrine in Bell
Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la sante et de la securiti du travail), (1988]1 S.C.R.
749 (health and safety laws inapplicable to federal undertaking). See also Commission
de transport de la Communaute urbaine de Quebec v. Canada (National Battlefields
Commission), [19901 2 S.C.R. 838 (provincial licensing law inapplicable to bus service
in federal park); Shulman v. McCallum (1993), 79 E.C.L.R. (2d) 393 (C.A.); leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, B.S.C.C., May 20, 1994, at 853 (provincial tort law inapplica-
ble to maritime accidents).
•• Supra, note 30, at 421-22, 428.
" Supra, note 31.
•• (19901 1 S.C.R. 1366.
with a sphere of individual autonomy or privacy by the provincial
arm of the state.43 At issue in Morgentaler was the constitutional
validity of the Nova Scotia Medical Services Act44 and accompanying
regulations.45 The Act prohibited the performance of a "designated
medical service" outside of an approved hospital. Penalties ranged
from $10,000 to $50,000 for each offence. The regulations passed
pursuant to the Act designated nine medical procedures subject to
the prohibition, one ofwhich was abortion. The stated purpose of the
Act was "to prohibit the privatization ofthe provision of certain med-
ical services in order to maintain a single high-quality health-care
delivery system for all Nova Scotians."
In passing the Act, it was clear that the Nova Scotia legislature
was responding to two events: first, the Supreme Court's 1988 deci-
sion in R. v. Morgentaler46 striking down the therapeutic abortion
provision of the Criminal Code47 as a violation of women's Charter
rights; and, second, to Dr. Morgentaler's stated intention to take
advantage of the absence of a criminal prohibition on abortion by
opening a clinic in Halifax. The governments of Nova Scotia and sev-
eral other provinces sought to implement policies that would main-
tain the restricted access to abortion services that had been
produced by the defunct Criminal Code provision.48
Dr. Morgentaler successfully argued that the Act and its regula-
tions were ultra vires the Nova Scotia legislature as an invasion of
the federal criminal law power. The judgment of Sopinka J. for a
unanimous Court is a clearly written, textbook example of how to
determine the pith and substance of a statute for the purposes of the
division of powers. The decision is notable in conducting a broad
inquiry that goes far beyond the "four corners of the legislation"49 to
examine extrinsic evidence, legal context, and legislative history
(including Hansard) in determining the purpose and effect of the
challenged law. By reference to this range of evidence, Sopinka J.,
like the lower courts, was able to make a convincing case that the
'3 See also R. v. Colarusso, supra, note 32, at 71-73 (La Forest J.'s majority judg-
ment suggests that, in a future case, sections of Ontario's Coroners Act may be found
to be invalid as an invasion of the federal criminal law power since they aHow the
police to rely on evidence obtained through a coroner's investigation).
.. RS.N.S. 1989, c. 281.
'5 Medical Services Designation Regulation, N.S. Reg. 152/89.
4. [1988) 1 S.C.R 30.
47 RS.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251, as it then was. Now RS.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 287.
•• See Gavigan, "Morgentaler and Beyond: Abortion, Reproduction, and the
Courts" in Brodie, Gavigan, and Jenson, The Politics ofAbortion (1992), at 140-45 for
a review of these developments.
4' R. v. Morgentaler, (1993] 3 S.C.R 463 at 483.
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true purpose of this legislation was "the prohibition of abortions out-
side hospitals as socially undesirable conduct subject to punish-
ment.,,50 The Act therefore was ultra vires because "the prohibition of
abortion with penal consequences has long been considered a subject
for the criminal law,,51 and the provinces cannot prohibit "tradition-
ally criminal conduct".52
This case has thus confirmed the "interesting paradox", noted by
Shelley Gavigan several years ago, that "the criminal denotation of
abortion [has] inhibited some forms ofprovincial restrictions".53 Iron-
ically, historical stigma is invoked to serve contemporary access to
abortion. Nevertheless, the zone of autonomy opened up by the lib-
eral structure of constitutional doctrine in this case is fragile and
limited. Ifthe lack of consensus among federal politicians onwhether
to pass a new federal criminal law turns out to be temporary, the
criminal construction of abortion could return in the future to
restrict women's moral agency and reproductive autonomy.
Moreover, the affirmation of the criminal cast of abortion regula-
tion does not call into question all provincial regulation of abortion
services. It does mean that provincial laws that have both a criminal
law form (prohibition coupled with a penalty) and a traditional crim-
inal law purpose (punishing the provision of abortions on moral
grounds) will be ultra vires the provinces. Otherwise, in Sopinka J.'s
words, provincial regulation of abortion may be valid if it is "solidly
anchored in one of the provincial heads of power which give the prov-
inces jurisdiction to legislate in relation to such matters as health,
hospitals, the practice of medicine and health care policy.,,64
Provinces may continue to be tempted to pursue a variety of
administrative and regulatory strategies that lack a punitive, crimi-
nal law form, yet may be equally effective in restricting access to
abortion. Thus, for example, the 1993 Morgentaler decision, like its
1988 predecessor, is not likely to prevent the provinces from refusing
to fund abortions. Charter and federalism jurisprudence have
worked together to create a perhaps temporary realm of private
autonomy free from punitive state intervention, but they do not
appear capable of placing positive obligations on the state to ensure
access to fully-funded abortion services.55
50 Id., at 513-14.
61 Id., at 491.
.2 Id., at 495.
68 Supra, note 48, at 141.
.. Supra, note 49, at 493-94.
•• For a thoughtful discussion ofthis point, see Brodie; "Health Versus Rights:
Comparative Perspectives on Abortion Policy in Canada and the United States" in Sen
and Snow (eds.), Power and Decision: The Social. Centrol ofReproduction (1994).
3. The State as Economic Actor
From a constitutional point of view, if the state is implicated in
economic life, then economic life ipso facto is subject to constitutional
overview. This is a conclusion resisted most strenuously by courts in
the era of the Charter. Rather than collapse the classical illusion of a
separate, private economic sphere, courts have preferred to recast
state economic activity so as to free it from constitutional relevance.
The next two cases we discuss can be understood as examples ofthis
judicial desire, not to erase the state from economic activities, but to
subsume those activities into non-constitutional spheres. In British
Columbia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),56 the
Court relocates a commitment to maintain the Vancouver Island
Railway from the private to the non-constitutional public, while, in
R. v. Howard,67 the Court equates treaty negotiations with aborigi-
nal peoples as equivalent to contractual arrangements in the private
sphere. The latter equation has the effect of relieving the state of its
constitutional obligations toward the First Nations articulated in the
Court's earlier jurisprudence.
The Court was asked in Vancouver Island Railway to characterize
the federal state's promise to construct and maintain an intercolonial
railway, a promise made expressly in Term 11 of the Thrms of Union68
upon which British Columbia entered the Canadian federation. The
particular issue raised by the case was whether the Government of
Canada had a continuing obligation to maintain a railway on the
southeastern coast of Vancouver Island. The sole reference to a con-
tinuing obligation to operate the railway could be found in the 1883
settlement that put into place the specific mechanics of the railway
construction.59 The British Columbia Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Court below, concluded unanimously that such a continuing
65 [1994] 2 S.C.R 41 ("Wmcouver Island Railway").
•, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299.
.8 ,Britis.h.Columbia Terms of Union, enacted as Order ofHer Majesty in Council
admlttmg BntlSh Columbia mto the Union [see RS.C. 1985, App. II, No. 10). Thnn 11
provided that the Dominion would "undertake to secure the commencement...of the
construction of a railway... to connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the rail-
way system of Canada" within two years of the date of union. '
.9 In consideration of the payment of $750,000 together with almost two million
acres oflandin southwestern Vancouver Island, and the further payment of $250,000
to complete the construction of a dry dock at Esquimault, the Dunsmuir Syndicate
~gre~d to ·constru~t. equip, ~aintain and work continuously" the railway line and to
contmuouslY,and m good fal~h operate the same." See An Act respecting the Vancou-
ver I~land Rall~.ay, the EsqU:lmault Graving Dock, and certain Railway Lands of the
Province of BTltlsh Columbia, granted to the Dominion, S.C. 1884, c. 6, s. 3, Sch.,
clauses 3 and 9, quoted in the Court's decision, supra, note 56, at 61.
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obligation had been incorporated into the 'Thrms of Union in 1871. The
Court disagreed, justifying its decision on a close and narrow reading
of the constitutional text. Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous
Court, focused on the term "Constitution of Canada" in section 52(2) of
the Constitution Act, 1982. According to Iacobucci J., the British
Columbia 'Thrms of Union were incorporated into the Constitution by
being included in the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, placing
the "constitutional status of Term 11 beyond doubt.- The same could
not be said of the subsequent arrangements in 1883 that accelerated
construction of the railway. Those arrangements were not itemized in
the schedule and were not, therefore, elevated to the status of"Consti-
tution". Thus, there existed only a constitutional "obligation of con-
struction...not an obligation of operation.'161
Of greater interest, for our purposes, is the way the Court charac-
terized the 1883 settlement. While resembling a move away from
classical liberal discourse, the Court resisted the implication of its
portrayal of the settlement as an exercise in nation-building.
Instead, it settled for a depiction of the state disconnected from its
constitutional setting, looking more like the myopic image of state
economic activity consistent with classical liberalism. Having
rejected the B.C. Supreme Court's characterization of the settlement
as imposing upon the federal government an obligation to operate
the railway, the only other judicial characterization available was
that of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Precious
Metals case.62 That case raised the question of who had title to gold
lying beneath the railway line belt. Lord Watson held in favour of the
province, and in so doing characterized Term 11 as "merely
embod[ying] the terms of a commercial transaction".63 Here the state
is likened to a purely economic actor in the private sphere of com-
merce - the same classical liberal construction we see in operation
in the Howard case, which we discuss below.
The Court, in finding that the 1883 agreements did not form part
60 Supra, note 56, at 82.
., Id., at 90. This textual approach poses the interesting question ofwhat exactly
is included within the scope of the term "Constitution of Canada". Justice Iacobucci
left this issue open, although he did quote an argument by Peter Hogg suggesting that
the phrase may not include a number of important pre-1867 Acts, such as the Royal
Proclamation of1763 [see RS.C. 1985, App. II, No.1]. On the significance of the Royal
Proclamation as a constitutional document, see Borrows, "Constitutional Law From a
First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation" (1994), 1
V.B.C. L. Rev. 1.
6' British Columbia (Attormy General) v. Canada (Attormy General) (1889), 14
App. Cas. 295 (P.C.); revg (1887), 14 S.C.R 345.
6. Id., at 304 (App. Cas.).
of the Constitution, found itself in agreement with Lord Watson in
result, but preferred to disassociate itself from his characterization
of the state in this context as a private actor. For the Court, the set-
tlement represented a "nation-building" arrangement of a political
(public), not an economic (private), character. In support ofthis view,
the Court suggested that Lord Watson did not mean what he said.
According to Iacobucci J., Lord Watson wished merely to refute the
characterization of the 'Thrms of Union in the Supreme Court of Can-
ada below. There, Ritchie C.J. had described the completion of the
railway line as "giving effect to, and carrying out, the constitutional
compact" between British Columbia and Canada,54 while Gwynne J.
portrayed these transactions as "being of the nature of a treaty
between these two independent bodies".65 According to Iacobucci J.,
Lord Watson did not believe that Term 11 was merely economic in
nature; rather, he wished to make clear in his ruling that Term 11
did not permit any negotiations outside the terms permitted by sec-
tion 146 ofthe Constitution Act, 1867,66 such as those that may occur
between the sovereign parties to a treaty. There is a great deal
inferred in Iacobucci J.'s reconstruction of Precious Metals, and its
plausibility depends upon reading Lord Watson out of the intellec-
tual context in which he was writing - in late nineteenth century
constitutional discourse, the state easily could be likened to a for-
profit venture and its activities subsumed within the private sphere.
The Court's strained attempt to distance itself from Lord Watson's
explicit views can be understood as signalling a re-drawing of the
publidprivate boundary, and an assertion that the public state
should not be viewed as a private economic actor. At the same time,
however, the Court denies the state is required to act, thus constru-
ing the state's economic role, while admittedly a "public" one, as
unhampered by constitutional obligation.
Obviously consistent with the classical liberal image of the state,
however, is the image of the state implicit in R. v. Howard.67 Here, in
dealing with the question of whether an aboriginal claimant's right
to fish had been extinguished by treaty, the Court depicts the state
as bargaining in a presumptively equal relationship with Aboriginal
peoples in treaty negotiations. No corrective is provided to an image
54 Id., at 358 (S.C.R).
.. Id., at 372.
•• Enacted as the British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), c. 3 [see KS.C. 1985,
App. II, No.5). Section 146 provided for the admission of Newfoundland, Prince
Edward Island, and British Columbia into the federation.
., Supra, note 57.
6. R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, as it then was.
69 [1990J 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1097-99.
70 This treaty is discussed and the rights flowing from the or.al assurances con-
firmed in R. u. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (CA).
71 Quoted, supra, note 57, at 302.
72 11991] 2 S.C.R. 570.
73 Supra, note 57, at 307.
of the state that is benevolent yet competitive, eager to bargain con-
tractually with other partners in conditions offormal equality - the
contrived conditions of equality usually associated with the private
sphere.
Howard, a member of the Hiawatha Band, was charged with fish-
ing out of season contrary to regulations passed pursuant to the fed-
eral Fisheries Act.68 The question was whether he had an "existing"
Aboriginal or treaty right recognized and affirmed by section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982. The Fisheries Act and regulations could
not have extinguished the appellant's rights; the R. v. Sparrow deci-
sion made clear that extensive regulation ofAboriginal rights did not
amount to extinguishment.69 An 1818 treaty signed by Howard's
ancestors had surrendered Aboriginal title over 1.95 million acres of
land in return for annual payments and oral assurances that fishing
and hunting rights would be respected over unoccupied Crown
land.7° However, in the 1923 Williams treaty, the Crown indicated it
was "desirous of obtaining a surrender" of "Indian title of the said
tribe to fishing, hunting and trapping rights" over all but reserve
lands. 'lb this end, the 1923 treaty, signed by representatives of the
Hiawatha Band, contained a provision by which the "said Indi~"
surrendered "all the right, title, interest, claim, demand and privi-
leges whatsoever" in "all other lands situate in the Province of
Ontario to which they ever had, now have, or now claim to have any
right, title, interest, claim, demand or privileges, except such
reserves as have heretofore been set apart for them by His Majesty
the King."71 The question was whether this provision evinced a "clear
and plain" intention to extinguish the appellant's Aboriginal right. to
fish preserved by the earlier (1818) treaty.
The Supreme Court, in a brief unanimous judgment written by
Gonthier J., found in favour of extinguishment and upheld the appel-
lant's conviction. The cursory attention given to the issue of extin-
guishment by adhesion to a treaty is reminiscent of the Court's 1991
decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation.72
In both cases the Court found the issues to be "essentially factual in
nature and the subject of concurrent findings in the courts below."73
The importance of both decisions "lies not so much in what was said
74 McNeil, "The High Cost of Accepting the Benefits from the Crown: A Com-
ment on the Temagami Indian Land Case", [199211 C.N.L.R 40 at 41.
" Supra, note 69, at 1106, per Dickson C.J. and La Forest J., quoting Professor
Noel Lyon.
76 [1984J 2 S.C.R 335 at 383.
77 Supra, note 69, at 1114.
78 For a detailed discussion of the argument that a federal policy of blanket
extinguishment is inconsistent with the spirit of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and
the Crown's fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples, see the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Treaty Making in the Spirit ofCo-existence (1995), at 45-58.
79 R. u. Howard, [19941 2 S.C.R. 299 at 307.
80 [d., at 306.
as what was left unsaid, particularly the unarticulated assumptions
lurking behind the court's words.'>'!4
The Howard case is a stark example of the methodologicallimita-
tions to the Court's stated commitment to interpreting section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 in a manner that achieves "a just settle-
ment for aboriginal peoples".75 In Guerin v. R:, Dickson C.J. noted
that one purpose of the treaty process is "to interpose the Crown
between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their
land, so as to prevent the Indians from being exploited."76 The Crown
is thus subject to a fiduciary duty to act in Aboriginal peoples' inter-
ests when exercising its discretion in relation to surrendered land.
Similarly, in Sparrow, the Court held that any interference with
existing aboriginal or treaty rights must be consistent with the
Crown's fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples.77 These princi-
ples would seem to require that the Crown also act in Aboriginal
peoples' interests at the earlier stage of negotiating the terms of a
surrender; exploitation in the name of protection from exploitation
remains exploitation. Yet, in Howard, the legitimacy of a Crown pol-
icy of pursuing blanket extinguishment of rights outside reserve
land is not questioned,7s nor is the fairness of the treaty exchange
considered.
Instead, the Court approached the treaty as if it were an ordinary
contract. Finding no ambiguity and no convincing evidence of misun-
derstanding on the part of the Aboriginal signatories, it could only
give effect to the "clear terms,,79 of the 1923 surrender. Justice
Gonthier found that the basket surrender clause, precisely because
of its "broad nature" and "wide sweeping effect", left no room for
ambiguity. It "was a conveyance in the broadest terms" that "clearly
identified" the territory covered by the surrender (all of Ontario save
the reserve land).80
The very breadth of the surrender clause, in other words, assured
its effectiveness in extinguishing Aboriginal rights. While this rea-
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soning may be persuasive as a literal interpretation of the sweeping
words of the treaty, it is troubling to the extent that it may be enlist-
ing the substantive unfairness of the bargain as a reason for enforc-
ing its literal terms.
Justice Gonthier did not find it necessary to mention directly the
principles that Aboriginal treaties should be liberally construed and
doubtful expressions resolved in favour of Aboriginal Wlderstand-
ingS.81 He made clear in the following passage why he considered
such an approach inapplicable:
The 1923 Treaty does not raise the same concerns as treaties signed in the
more distant past or in more remote territories where one can legiti-
mately question the understanding of the Indian parties (compare R. v.
Sioui ...and Eastmain Band v. Canada... ). The 1923 Treaty concerned
lands in close proximity to the urbanized Ontario of the day. The Hia-
watha signatories were businessmen, a civil servant and all were literate.
In short, they were active participants of the economy and society of their
province. The terms of the Treaty and specifically the basket clause are
entirely clear and would have been understood by the seven signatories.8\!
The implication is that principles of liberal interpretation applied to
treaties in the distant past, such as the 1760 treaty at issue in Sioui,
have limited relevance to more modern treaties, such as the 1975
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement at issue in Eastmain or
the 1923 Williams Treaty at issue in Howard. The passage from
Eastmain relied upon by Gonthier J. makes this clear:
The principle that ambiguities must be construed in favour of the Aborig-
inals rests, in the case of historic treaties, on the unique vulnerability of
the Aboriginal parties, who were not educated and were compelled to
negotiate with parties who had a superior bargaining position, in lan-
guages and with legal concepts which were foreign to them and without
adequate representation.
In this case, there was simply no such vulnerability.s3
The approach of the Federal Court ofAppeal, adopted by Gonthier
J., accords liberal treaty interpretation principles a purely formal
rather than substantive purpose. Unless there is evidence of diver-
gent Wlderstandings or an absence of independent legal knowledge
or advice, treaties apparently will be interpreted like ordinary con-
81 See, e.g., Simon v. R., [1985J 2 s.e.R. 387; Nowegijick v. R., [19831 1 s.e.R. 29;
and R. v. Sioui. [1990] 1 s.e.R. 1025.
82 Supra, note 79, at 306·7.
83 Eastmain Band v. Canada, [1993] 1 F.e. 501 at 515.
tracts or real estate transactions. In short, the Court's stated com-
mitment to liberal interpretation of Aboriginal treaties apparently
has nothing to do with redressing an inherent inequality of bargain-
ing power or inhibiting judicial confirmation of one-sided bargains.
The position that the formal equality of the parties to treaty negoti-
ations banishes concerns about exploitation of the Aboriginal signato-
ries is consistent with classical liberal thinking about commercial
transactions. However, it represses the fact that the Canadian state
has a great deal more economic, political and coercive power at its dis-
posal than do Aboriginal peoples. Moreover, before 1982, Canadian
law held that the federal Crown could extinguish Aboriginal rights
unilaterally by executive or legislative action. Seeking a "voIWltary"
surrender through treaty negotiations was an option that the Crown
could choose to pursue or abandon at its pleasure. Obviously, the
Crown's claim to sovereignty and the accompanying threat of unilat-
eral extinguishment that hung over treaty negotiations placed Aborig-
inal peoples in a decidedly unenviable bargaining position. 'Ib
presume that Aboriginal peoples were not vulnerable to exploitation
in these circumstances is to ignore the power dynamics in the colonial
relationship between First Nations and the Canadian state.
III. THE FEDERAL STATE
Unlike the other conceptions of the state we discuss, the Consti-
tution is explicit in creating our second conception, namely a federal
state with jurisdiction divided between two levels of government.
The federal and provincial levels of the state are, in Wheare's classic
definition of federalism,84 coordinate and autonomous when acting
within their exclusive sphere of jurisdiction established by the con-
stitutional division of powers. The judiciary has taken on the task of
preserving the federal form of the state by defining and policing the
boundaries of federal and provincial powers. In doing so, judges
inevitably attempt to give effect to their sense of the appropriate
balance between federal and provincial interests. Less obviously,
perhaps, but no less inevitably, how judges define the scope of fed-
eral and provincial powers also is influenced by their support fodor
antipathy to) the other three conceptions oflegitimate state activity
we discuss.
The federal form of the Canadian state is, of course, a constant
presence in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, whether the
84 Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed. 1963), at 10.
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Court is engaged in its traditional role as arbiter of the legislative divi-
sion of powers or its more recent role in defining Charter rights and
freedoms. There are several striking features of the Court's attitude to
the federal form of the state. One is the absence of a normative appre-
ciation of federalism in much of the Court's jurisprudence. Another is
the Court's determination to avoid appearing to be entangled in the
politics offederalism. In fact, the Court has proven itself to be a crafty
political actor over the years, and its manipulation of the contingent
and shifting law/politics divide is a key component of its political art.
These features of the Court's attitude toward federalism· ensure
that much of its federalism jurisprudence is characterized by a dry
legalism. One would have no way of knowing from a reading of the
Court's decisions that Canadian federalism is undergoing profo\ll1d
changes and challenges provoked by Quebec nationalism, the strug-
gle for political and constitutional recognition of aboriginal self-gov-
ernment, the fiscal crisis of the state, and the perception of powerful
de facto limits placed on state sovereignty by globalization and the
growing power of international capital.
In contrast to the Charter, where, as we will argue, the protection
of the interests of vulnerable groups is a major rhetorical device
employed by the Court to legitimize the exercise ofjudicial power, the
interests of groups or individuals are buried in the federalism cases.
For example, the interests of workers seeking to form a union or
women's interest in reproductive autonomy are not addressed in the
Ontario Hydro and Morgentaler cases, respectively. Rather, what is
presented as vulnerable or fragile in the Court's federalism jurispru-
dence is the "balance" of federal and provincial powers. In Ontario
Hydro, for example, a majority of the Court discusses the need to
limit the scope of the federal declaratory and pogg powers to ensure
such powers do not threaten an abstractly conceived federal "bal-
ance". In addition, the Court sees federalism itself as something of a
nuisance: the multiple opportunities it creates for state intervention
and resulting regulatory complexity pose a potential threat to admin-
istrative efficiency and to classical liberal or neo-liberal conceptions
of the role of the state. Thus, in Hunt v. T&N PLC, the federal state
is seen as a potential threat to "comity". The Court presents the ide-
als of "balance" and "comity" as threatened by political forces, thus
legitimizing the exercise ofjudicial power through constitutional law.
Yet, the Court has not been able to follow through on its commit-
ment to "balance".85 Commentators in recent editions of this review
S5 Just as it has failed to follow through, we will show below, in its stated goal of
protecting vulnerable groups in a number of Charter cases.
have remarked that the Court's activism has taken a marked cen-
tralist turn.86 This trend continued in the 1993-94 Term: none of the
federalism cases hindered, and most of them promoted, federal poli-
cies and federal powers. Provincial chums to jurisdiction, on the
other hand, met with little success.
One example of the ease with which the Court dismissed a provin-
cial claim to jurisdiction is the case of Telephone Guevremont Inc. v.
Quebec (Regie des telecommunications).87 The issue in the case was
whether Telephone Guevremont, a private company providing tele-
phone services in two small municipalities in Quebec, was a local
undertaking subject to provincial regulatory authority or an inter-
provincial undertaking within federal jurisdiction. Central to the
argument in the case was whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Alberta Government Thlephones v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Thlevi-
sion and Thlecommunications Commission)88 could be distinguished.
In that case, the Court held that AGT fell within federal jurisdiction
even though it did not operate beyond the boundaries of a province.
The Court reached this conclusion by relying on AGT's ability to pro-
vide interprovincial and international service to its subscribers, its
physical connections at the province's border, and its membership in
Telecom Canada. The practical result of the decision was that all of
the major telephone companies in Canada now fell within federal
jurisdiction. Companies operating at the municipal level like TG con-
tinued to be regulated provincially, presumably "on the assumption
that the absence of direct interprovincial connections makes the
AGT case inapplicable."89
In a one paragraph judgment, the Court found that TG, like AGT,
was an interprovincial undertaking. Chief Justice Lamer's brief rea-
sons indicated that the Court found the nature of the service pro-
vided to subscribers to be determinative of the issue. Federal
jurisdiction, he said, follows:
...by reason of the nature of the services provided and the mode of opera-
tion of the undertaking, which provides a telecommunication signal car-
rier service whereby its subscribers send and receive interprovincial and
international communications...90
•• For example, Robin Elliot remarked that "[olne of the striking features of
these decisions [in the 1989-90 Thrml is that, in all but one of them, the claim on
behalf of provincial jurisdiction was rejected." See Elliot, "Developments in Constitu-
tional Law: The 1989-90 Thrm" (l991), 2 S.C.L.R. (2d) 83 at 93.
87 [199411 S.C.R. 878.
•• [1989) 2 S.C.R. 225.
• 9 Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada (3rd ed. 1992), at 599.
90 Supra, note 87, at 879.
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The consolidation of federal jurisdiction over telecommunications
and the "information highway", largely accomplished in AGT, was
thus rendered complete. The minimal room left for balancing local
and national interests in telecommunications through a division of
provincial and federal competence has now been completely closed.
National and international integration of communications was held
to extinguish local interests. That this conclusion was reached with
no discussion appears to belie the Court's oft-stated concern with
preserving the balance of federal and provincial powers. '
A similar disregard of a provincial claim to jurisdiction is evident
in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations BoardJ.91 As discussed,
above, the issue in the case was whether the labour relations of
employees at Hydro's nuclear electrical generating facilities fell
within the federal declaratory or pogg powers, or within provincial
jurisdiction over the "management" of hydroelectric facilities pursu-
ant to section 92A(1)(c). The Court was invited to read the declara-
tory power narrowly to reflect the fact that Canadian constitutional
practices have moved toward a fuller embrace of federalism and a
rejection of the unitary elements of the Constitution. Like the disal-
lowance and reservation powers in the 1867 Act, the declaratory
power is fundamentally at odds with the notion that, in a federal
state, governments are equal in status and autonomous when acting
within their respective spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. As La Forest
J. put it: "the declaratory power is an unusual one that fits uncom-
fortably in an ideal conceptual view offederalism."92
Yet, La Forest J. (L'Heureux-DuM and Gonthier JJ. concurring)
rejected this suggestion in no uncertain terms: "the Constitution", he
said, "must be read as it is, and not in accordance with abstract
notions of theorists." He noted that there was "no authority supporting
the view that the declaratory power should be narrowly construed"
and no constitutional provision which empowered the courts to
express an opinion about its exercise. As for the argument that confin-
ing the declaratory power was necessary to avoid endangering "the
structure ofCanadian federalism", he suggested that it evinced "a mis-
understanding of the respective roles oflaw and politics in the specifi-
cally Canadian form of federalism established by the Constitution":93
The courts have not engaged in the task of defining the manner in which
these broad political bases of Canadian federalism should be protected.
91 [19931 3 S.C.R. 327.
92 ld., at 370.
93 ld., at 370.71.
The Constitution has not accorded them that mandate. These are matters
for the people."
The line drawn here between law and politics is a familiar one. It
would be unremarkable were it not for the fact that neither La For-
e~'t J. nor the Court as a whole has consistently eschewed interpreta-
tIon based on non-textual, structural argumentation. The Court has
been willing to place limits on legislative powers where it believes
that constitutional structure or norms dictate such a result. Indeed
La Forest J.'s judgment in Hunt v. T&N PLC,95 released severai
months after t~e Ontario Hydro decision, has been described in a
recent commentary as a "tour de force" ofexactly this kind of "consti-
tutional alchemy".96 In Hunt, which is discussed in more detail
below, La Forest J. embarked on a search for a "workable balance
between diversity and uniformity,"97 and, following the approach he
developed in the earlier Morguard98decision, ended up finding that a
"full faith and credit" clause was "inherent in the structure of the
Canadian federation".99 Given the lack of "authority" for this result,
and the lack of a textual mandate, it would be fanciful to describe
the Hunt decision as one that gave effect to the "constitution as it is"
rather than the "abstract notions of theorists". Rather, it appears
that La Forest J. is only selectively hesitant to engage in creative,
structural forms ofreasoning.
In Ontario Hydro, a 4:3 majority of the Court was willing to place
minimal restrictions on the declaratory power in an attempt to bol-
ster the federal principle. In his judgment for three members of the
Court/oo Iacobucci J.'s respect for "the primacy of the balance
between federal and provincial powers"lOl led him to conclude that
the declaratory power is "not plenary, but extends only to those
aspects of the work which make the work specifically of federal juris-
diction."lo2 He concluded that "[c]ontrol of labour relations is not
integral to the federal interest in the nuclear plants."lo3 ChiefJustice
Lamer agreed with the balancing principles espoused by Iacobucci
•• ld., at 372-73.
" [19931 4 S.C.R. 289.
,. Black and MacKay, "Constitutional Alchemy in the Supreme Court: Hunt v. T
& N pte" (1994), 5 N.J.C.L. 79 at 79-80.
'7 Supra, note 95, at 296.
,. Morguard Investments Ltd. v, De Savoye, [19901 3 S.C.R. 1077.
9' Supra, note 95, at 324.
100 Justices Sopinka and Cory concurring (dissenting in result).
101 Supra, note 91, at 404.
102 ld., at 405.
103 ld., at 422.
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J., but came to a different result in this case. Like La Forest J., he
concluded that the regulation of labour relations at nuclear energy
facilities was integral to Parliament's declaratory jurisdiction.104
The judges' reasoning with respect to the pogg power was similar.
The Court was unanimous in finding that the regulation of nuclear
power was a subject matter that met the national dimensions test set
out by Le Dain J. in R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. 105 Justices
La Forest and Lamer went on to conclude in their majority judg-
ments that jurisdiction over labour relations is "integral" to Parlia-
ment's pogg jurisdiction. Their judgments suggest that the pogg
analysis has the same effect on provincial jurisdiction as the declara-
tory power analysis: that is, provincial jurisdiction in relation to
labour relations is ousted.
It is hard to understand why the majority finding that labour rela-
tions is an "integral part" of federal jurisdiction is sufficient reason, let
alone to find in favour of federal jurisdiction but also to oust the pro-
vincial claim to jurisdiction. Labour relations can be no less "integral"
to provincial jurisdiction under section 92A(I)(c) than to federal juris-
diction. According to the Court's jurisprudence, provincial laws must
be read down to prevent their application to vital parts of the manage-
ment of undertakings within federal jurisdiction. However, the Court
has never suggested that federal laws have to be read down to prevent
their application to vital parts of the management of undertakings
within provincial jurisdiction. No explanation has ever been offered for
this lack of reciprocity in the application of the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine. Yet the Court departs fundamentally from the
notion of equal status inherent in the federal principle when it treats
federal powers as more exclusive than provincial powers.
Moving on from the division of powers analysis, it is important to
note that federalism themes also appear in Charter discourse. This
should not be surprising. The Charter arguably has a centralizing
effect on Canadian federalism because it binds all of the provinces to
a national rights regime. Quebec rejected the Charter largely for this
reason; it imposed the federal agenda, including strengthened official
bilingualism, upon Quebec. The tension between centralist and pro-
vincialist approaches to Canadian federalism is reflected in the dif-
ferent positions staked out by members of the Court in the area of
language rights. 106And importantly, for our purposes, it may also
10' Id., at 340.
105 [1988J 1 S.C.R 401.
106 See, e.g., Quebec (Attorney General) u. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R 1016; Mac.
donald u. Montreal (City), [1986J 1 S.C.R. 460; and Societe des acadiens du Nouueau·
Brunswick Inc. u. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls District 50
Branch, (1986]1 S.C.R. 549.
help to explain some of the differences between the majority and
minority judgments in Haig v. Canada. 107 The issues in Haig arose
in the context of the Charlottetown Accord referendum. Due to a
combination of residency requirements and a recent move from
Ontario to Quebec, Graham Haig "fell between the legislative
cracks"108 and was unable to vote in either the Quebec or the federal
referendum held on proposed amendments to the Canadian Consti-
tution contained in the Charlottetown Accord. Residents in every
province outside Quebec were entitled to vote in the federal referen-
dum, and those in Quebec (who met the six-month residency require-
ment, which Mr. Haig did not) were entitled to vote in a parallel
referendum, on the same question and held on the same day, initi-
ated and administered by the Quebec government. Haig argued,
inter alia, that the exclusion of Quebeckers from the federal referen-
dum violated section 15 because it discriminated on the basis of Que-
bec residency.
Justice L'Heureux-DuM, writing for the majority, rejected this
claim, arguing that differential treatment ofprovinces by the federal
government and Parliament did not constitute discrimination. For
her, Parliament is under no obligation to treat all provinces equally,
whether in holding a referendum or in any other way. Moreover,
"[d]ifferences between provinces are a rational part of the political
reality in the federal process", and thus differential treatment of
provinces by Parliament is "a legitimate means of promoting and
advancing the values of a federal system."109 Thus, the majority can
be understood as antagonistic to the pan-Canadian ideal that tends
to emphasize the formal equality of provinces and therefore would
not tolerate one province being left out of a federal referendum. The
latter approach can be found in Iacobucci J.'s dissenting judgment.
For him, the federal referendum was a national one whose aim "was
to include all Canadian citizens", lIO and it was therefore constitu-
tionally impermissible under section 2(b) for the federal government
to deny the residents of Quebec, or any other province, the opportu-
nity to vote. The majority, however, agreed with L'Heureux-DuM J.
and thus, wittingly or not, supported the conception of federalism
underlying it. This result contrasts sharply with the centralist ten-
dencies evident, as noted earlier, in the Court's approach to division
of powers cases. The contrast may be explained, in part, by the fact
107 [1993] 2 S.C.R 995.
108 Id., at 1065, per Iacobucci J.
109 Id., at 1047.
110 Id., at 1065.
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Haig raised directly the question of Quebec's political autonomy
within Canadian federalism. One might speculate that the majority's
approach was driven by a sense, widely shared in the wake of the
Charlottetown Accord's failure, that the survival of Canada as a
nation largely depends upon there being sufficient flexibility within
Canadian federalism to accommodate Quebec's demands for political
autonomy.
IV: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STATE
AND VULNERABLE GROUPS
A third conception of the state that plays an important role in
Charter jurisprudence is what we have referred to as the social dem-
ocratic state. Here, in contrast to the classical liberal approach, the
state, whether in its federal or provincial form, is understood in posi-
tive terms, not as an instrument of coercion that must be constrained
to protect individual freedom but as an active force promoting the
equality and welfare of citizens. The social democratic approach rec-
ognizes that social and economic relations in the "private" sphere are
structured by substantial inequalities of power among groups, and
that, because of this, some groups are able systematically to exploit,
oppress, and deny opportunities and resources to others. Whether in
the context of class, race, gender or other dimensions of social rela-
tions, systemic inequalities are acknowledged, and the state is
understood as being responsible for redressing them proactively,
either through social spending or regulation. This idea of the state is
articulated in the following passage from L'Heureux-Dube J.'s judg-
ment in Comite paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v. Potash:
Canadians recognize that government has traditionally had and contin-
ues to have an important role to play in the creation and preservation ofa
just Canadian society... .It is, in my view, untenable to suggest that free-
dom is co-extensive with the absence of government. Experience shows
the contrary, that freedom has often required the intervention and protec-
tion of government against private action.11l
Consistent with this, the Court has recognized in numerous Char-
ter cases that a central and legitimate role for the state, and the
Charter itself, is to protect "vulnerable groups". This concern oper-
111 [1994] 2 S.C.a. 406 at 447. The passage is cited from Cory J.'sjudgment in R.
v. Wholesale 'Iravel Group Inc., [1991] 3 S.C.a. 154 which, in tum, is citing the pas-
sage from Wilson J. in McKinney v. University orGuelph, [1990] 3 S.C.a. 229.
ates in the Court's jurisprudence both to shape the interpretation of
particular rights and freedoms (as we shall see in Haig,112 Peterbor-
ough (City) v. Ramsden/IS and Symes v. Canada1l4); and to engender
a deferential posture by the Court to legislation it considers neces-
sary to prevent groups with social and economic power from exploit-
ing and oppressing those without it (as we shall see in Comite
paritaire1l5 and Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)1l5).
The Court's approach to "vulnerable groups" in each context provides
insight into the politics of Charter litigation. This is a point we will
draw out in analyzing the above-mentioned cases and Hy & Zel's Inc.
v. Ontario (Attorney General)ll7 and International Longshoreman's
and Warehouseman's Union, Canada Area Local 500 v. Canada. liS
We contend that, despite the Court's formal and constant invocation
of the importance of shaping a constitutional jurisprudence consis-
tent with state protection of vulnerable groups, the resulting judg-
ments are often far from clear applications of this larger judicial self-
conception.
1. Class
The social democratic and "vulnerable groups" themes are most
pronounced in this Term's cases in relation to the social inequalities
created by economic class. We are using "class" here primarily to
describe two groups: those who own productive property, and those
who do not.1l9 Throughout several of the cases decided this Term,
the Court recognized that the latter group requires the protection
(of the Charter and, more generally, of the state) from the power of
the former. In Haig and Peterborough, the Court recognized the
relationship among property ownership, social power, and the
capacity of individuals to express themselves effectively; in Comite
paritaire, it recognized employers' pOWer to exploit their employees,
though, as ILWU confirms, such recognition did not lead the Court
to providing Charter protection to unions; and finally, in tension
with its stated reluctance to extend rights protection to corpora-
112 Supra, note 107.
113 [19931 2 S.C.R. 1084.
11' [1993) 4 S:C.R. 695.
116 Supra, note 111.
ll6 [1993) 3 S.C.R. 519.
117 [1993) 3 S.C.R. 675.
118 [1994]1 S.C.a. 150.
ll9 Productive property, in contrast to personal property, is property that can be
used commercially.
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tions, the Court in Hy & Zel's found that a for-profit corporation may
be granted public interest standing. Economic class is the explicit or
implicit issue in all ofthese cases. Consistent with our earlier asser-
tion, we will argue that while recognizing the social inequalities
generated by capitalist class relations, the Court (not surprisingly)
neither criticized that system nor seriously redressed its outcomes;
indeed, some of the decisions can be understood as potentially exac-
erbating those inequalities.
(a) Communications
The inequalities generated by the political economy of communica-
tions have been regularly noted by activists and scholars. l20 Concerns
about public broadcasting, regulation of the media, the dependence
of media enterprises on advertising revenue, and concentration of
media ownership are all referable to a more general problem: those
who own media enterprises have inordinate power to shape the dis-
cursive and ideological environment in which citizens live and, by
corollary, those who do not own such resources have little access, if
any, to effective public communication. Traditionally, this kind of cri-
tique has been developed by people on the left. It is therefore of some
interest that the Court picked up on the critique in Haig and in
Peterborough. In Haig, L'Heureux-DuM J., writing for the majority,
cited authors like Owen Fiss and Allan Hutchinson who argue that
factors such as concentration of media ownership, together with most
people's lack of access to and resources for effective communication,
mean there are substantial impediments to the realization of free-
dom of expression. l2l In Peterborough, Iacobucci J., writing for the
majority, cited favourably an earlier statement ofL'Heureux-Dube J.
that, within the private domain, "[o]nly those with enough wealth to
own land, or mass media facilities (whose ownership is largely con-
centrated), [are] able to engage in free expression" and "only the
favoured few have any avenue to communicate with the public."122
There is, then, a recognition that the market-organization of commu-
nication media denies the capacity of most people to exercise their
freedom of expression.
There is not, however, much the Court can do directly to remedy the
'20 See, for example, Schiller, Culture Inc. (1989); Keane, The Media and DeTrUJc·
racy (1991); and Curran and Seaton, Power Without Responsibility (1991).
121 Supra, note 107, at 1037-38.
l2'l Supra, note 113, at 1097, quoting Committee for the Commonwealth ofCanada
v. Canada, [1991J 1 S.C.R. 139 at 198.
problem it recognized. Without overruling its several decisions on the
question of who has obligations under the Charter - beginning with
Dolphin Delivery123 - it cannot impose obligations on private actors,
like the Globe and Mail or CTv, to respect individuals' rights of free-
dom of expression by, say, providing public access to their facilities.
Nor, more generally, can it deploy the Charter to regulate markets or
redistribute income and wealth so as to ensure a more even distribu-
tion ofresources to engage in communicative activity. Though not sug-
gesting such radical solutions, the Court did consider in Haig and
Peterborough two routes through which peoples' capacity to exercise
their right to freedom of expression might be improved: first, section
2(b) might be interpreted as imposing a positive obligation on govern-
ment to promote this capacity (Haig); and, second, public property
(government owned as opposed to privately owned) could be made
available under section 2(b) to members of the public for expression
(Peterborough). We will look at each of these options in turn.
"Does freedom of expression include a positive right to be provided
with specific means of expression?"124 That was the central question
raised in relation to section 2(b) according to the majority in Haig v.
Canada. Graham Haig challenged his exclusion from the federal ref-
erendum not only under section 15 (as discussed above) but also as a
violation of section 2(b). The federal government, he argued, had a
positive obligation (corresponding to his section 2(b) rights) to pro-
vide him with an opportunity to vote in the referendum. The major-
ity rejected Haig's claim, but agreed with him that freedom of
expression might have a positive element. Though the tradition in
both Canadian and American freedom of expression jurisprudence is
to "conceptualize freedom of expression in terms of negative rather
than positive entitlements"l25 - to "prohibit gags, but...not compel
the distribution of megaphones"126 - such a strictly negative
approach, according to the majority, "may not in all circumstances
guarantee the optimal functioning of the marketplace of ideas."127
Positive state action might be needed to remedy such factors as lack
of resources and opportunities for speech, and concentration of
media ownership,128 that block the realization of freedom of expres-
123 Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd., [1986J 2 S.C.R. 573.
,... Supra, note 107, at 1034.
'25 Id.
126 Id., at 1035.
'27 Id., at 1037.
'28 Id., at 1038.
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sion for most people. 129 According to the majority:
...a situation might arise in which, in order to make a fundamental free-
dom meaningful, a posture of restraint would not be enough, and positive
governmental action might be required. This might~ for exa~ple, ta~e. the
form of legislative intervention aimed at preventmg certam condIbons
which muzzle expression, or ensuring public access to certain kinds Qf
information.
In the proper context, these may perhaps be relevant considerations
leading a court to conclude that positive governmental action is required.130
The majority provided little sense of what would constitute a
"proper context", but if its reasons for rejecting Mr. Haig's claim are
any indication, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances that would
lead the Court to impose positive obligations under section 2(b). Here,
the Court was unwilling to find a positive obligation on government
either to solicit citizens' opinions by holding a referendum, or to solicit
all citizens' opinions in the event a referendum was held. The principle
underlying this conclusion appears to be that a legislature has no obli-
gation under the Charter to create a positive remedy where that rem-
edy would normally be a matter of legi~lative p~licy. Dra~g ~
analogy with the rights to strike and bargam collectively, the ma]onty
held that the right to participate in a referendum is "a creation of leg-
islation",l3l "a matter of legislative policy and not of constitutional
law" and a "statutorily created platform for expression."132 "A govern-
ment is under no constitutional obligation to extend this platform of
expression to anyone, let alone to everyone."l33 On this reasoning, it is
hard to imagine a "proper context" for a court requiring the govern-
ment to take positive action. The circularity of the reasoning -
because a matter (referendum, strikes, collective bargaining) is dealt
with by the legislature, it is a matter oflegislative policy and therefore
not one of constitutional obligation -likely would lead to the failure of
most claims that the Charter requires a legislature to take positive
action by creating conditions conducive to the exercise of rights.
Peterborough (City) v. Ramsden134 develops a second approach to
broadening the scope of freedom of expression rights. It follows a pre-
129 The majority (id., at 1038) refers to Dickson C.J.'s dissenting opinion in Refer-
ence Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987\ 1 S.C.R. 313, where he
states (at 361) that the "absence of government intervention may in effect substan-
tially impede the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms",
130 Id., at 1039.
131 Id., at 1040.
1.2 Id., at 1041.
133 Id. (emphasis in original).
13< [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084.
vious decision, Committee for the Commonwealth ofCanada v. Can-
ada,135 in finding that government, as property owner is, unlike its
private counterparts, subject to section 2(b) of the Charter. Kenneth
Ramsden, who had advertised an upcoming performance of his band
by affixing posters to utility poles, was charged with having contra-
vened a Peterborough by-law that prohibited postering on all public
property, including utility poles. Ramsden alleged the by-law vio-
lated his section 2(b) rights. The first question the Court had to
answer was whether the government as property owner (the City in
this case) has an absolute right (as would a private owner) to restrict
the freedom of expression of those using its property. The Court said
not: government property owners are prima facie bound by section
2(b) in exercising their property rights. In justifying this result the
Court referred, as in Haig, to the fact that people without property
or resources have limited capacities to exercise their freedom of
expression. The availability of public property to them as a forum for
expression is presented by the Court as compensation for this. Pos-
tering, the Court noted, is used by minority groups as an economical
way to publicize new ideas and causes. It is a "medium of communi-
cation of revolutionary and unpopular ideas" that effectively creates
"circulating libraries of the poor."136 The Court concluded that gov-
ernment property owners, in contrast to private ones, must respect
freedom of expression rights, though not in all circumstances.
Unfortunately, the Court was not very clear in defining the cir-
cumstances in which government does and does not have obligations
in relation to freedom of expression. In the earlier Commonwealth
decision, three judgments established three quite dissimilar sets of
criteria for determining when governments can and cannot prohibit
the use oftheir property for communication. Justice L'Heureux-Dube
held that all such restrictions limit section 2(b) and must be justified
under section 1; Lamer C.J. found there would not be a limit on sec-
tion 2(b) if the expressive activity was inconsistent with the function
of the property involved; and, for McLachlin J., expression on public
property would not be protected under section 2(b) unless the expres-
sion served one of the underlying values of freedom of expression.
Peterborough does not resolve the doctrinal issue of which approach
should be taken in public property cases. "[I]t is not necessary",
according to Iacobucci J.,"to determine which of the three
approaches should be adopted"l37 because, in his view, the applica-
13. Supra, note 122.
130 Supra, note 134, at 1102 (quoting an expert on the history ofpostering).
137 Id., at 1100.
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tion of each of them leads to the conclusion that postering on utility
poles falls within the scope of section 2(b)'s protection. ISS
Despite the Court's failure to commit to one set of criteria for
determining when government property owners are bound by section
2(b), the decision in Peterborough has some positive elements. It does
acknowledge that, without freedom of expression rights on public
property, only those who own property would have the capacity to
exercise their Charter rights. Those who do not own property would
literally have no space to use their freedom of expression rig?ts
meaningfully. On both privately- and publicly-owned property (like
streets, parks, utility poles, and so on) they would be subject to the
same power of property owners to prohibit their speech. At. the saD;1e
time, however, it is important to note that Peterborough WIll add ht-
tle if anything to the very limited opportunities of most people to
engage in effective expression in their day-to-day lives. It will not
change the fact they have few resources to communicate beyond their
immediate environments; nor that they are subject, as employees,
tenants, or family members, to the unconstrained authority of those
who own the spaces they inhabit to silence them; nor that the corpo-
rate cultural industries have a disproportionate influence on their
discursive environments. Utility poles as circulating libraries of the
poor is a nice idea, but most people would probably rather own a tele-
vision station. Public property as a forum of expression cannot com-
pensate for the radically unequal distribution of communicative
capacity in Canada. 'Ib suggest that it can (as the Court implies) is to
downplay - even legitimate - that inequality.
(b) Labour Relations
Central to the rise of the social welfare state in Canada was the
development of collective bargaining and employment standards legis-
lative regimes. The usual justification for such regimes is that they
protect workers from undue exploitation where they are vulnerab~e
because of the inequality of bargaining power between them and theIr
employers. 'Ib this end, these regimes provide workers with rights in
the workplace and facilitate collective action. The Court in its Charter
jurisprudence has tended to accept such social democraticexplana-
tions of the need for labour legislation, while at the same time main-
taining a classical liberal suspicion of unions. In holding that
employment standards139 and labour legislation14o should be upheld
. ,.. Id., at 1100-04.
'39 R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
140 Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service EmplllYees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
under the Charter, the Court has noted the need for such measures to
protect workers' interests in light of the inequalities of bargaining
power that exist vis-a-vis their employers. These social democratic
sentiments are hard to find, however, in the seven majority decisions
of the Court in previous terms where unions have unsuccessfully
sought to have collective bargaining, strikes and picketing protected
by the Charter.14I The pattern is sustained in this Term's decisions.
The first case, Comite paritaire de l'industrie de la chemise v. Pot-
ash,142 concerned Quebec's Act Respecting Collective Agreement
Decrees (ACAD).143 The Act allows the terms of a collective agree-
ment negotiated by a union in a particular sector of the economy to
be extended by legislative decree to all employees in the sector,
including non-union ones. Parity committees are set up for each sec-
tor to ensure the decree is implemented, with the power to conduct
investigations and inspect workplaces. In the present case, inspec-
tors from a parity committee for the shirt industry sought to exercise
their investigative powers in response to a complaint that an alleged
sub-contractor of Selection Milton, a shirt manufacturer, was not
paying its employees. The respondents claimed that the ACAD vio-
lated section 8 of the Charter (and parallel provisions ofthe Quebec
Charterl44). The Court unanimously held that the searches and sei-
zures authorized by section 22(e) of the ACAD were "reasonable" for
the purpose of section 8 of the Charter and therefore did not infringe
that section.145 Each of the two judgments, one by La Forest J., and
the other by L'Heureux-DuM J., reached this conclusion on the basis
of remarkably similar reasons. At the core of each judgment is a
social democratic conception of the state. The ACAD is characterized
as regulatory legislation designed to protect a vulnerable groupI46 -
'4' Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 500 v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd., supra, note 123; British Columbia Government EmplllYees' Union v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), 11988J 2 S.C.R. 214; Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, note 129; Public Service Alliance of Canada v.
Canada, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 424; Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Locals
544, 496, 635 & 955 v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460; Newfoundland (Attorney
General) v. Newfoundland Assn. ofPublic Employees, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 204; and Profes-
sional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commis-
sioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367.
14. [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406.
143 R.S.Q. 1977, c. D-2.
'« Charter ofHuman Rights ami Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12.
,.. Supra, note 142, at 418-25 and 441-53.
14. The Court's deferential posture to regulatory legislation also provides a basis
for its refusal to follow Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984) 2 S.C.R. 145. Because, in the
present case, the industry is heavily regulated there is a relatively low expectation of
privacy on the part ofemployers (per La Forest J., supra, note 142, at 420-22; per L'Heu-
reux-Dulle J., id., at 444-45); and the "stigmas normally associated with criminal inves-
tigations and their consequences are less draconian" (per La Forest J., id., at 424).
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employees who, due to being in small businesses with low levels of
unionization, "are among the most vulnerable."'47
Importantly, the judgments in Comite paritaire do not say workers
are vulnerable as a class to the exploitation of employers, only that
particular sub-groups ofworkers, especially those who are not union-
ized, are vulnerable. The implication is that others are not. The con-.
trary view, that workers are exploited by employers as a class, has
made only one appearance in the Court's Charter decisions, and that
in a dissenting judgment. Chief Justice Dickson's partial dissent in
Alberta Reference noted the "inherent inequalit[y] of bargaining
power in the employment relationship".l48 "Throughout history", it
continued, "workers have associated to overcome their vulnerability
as individuals to the strength of their employers.,,149 Without the
capacity to do so (which would include the right to strike), they would
be "vulnerable and ineffective to meet on more equal terms the power
and strength of those with whom their interests interact and, per-
haps, conflict."'50 In other words, workers, as a class, are a "vulnera-
ble group" in the absence of the capacity to act collectively~ The.
majority in the Alberta Reference saw things differently. Justice
Mcintyre, one of the majority judges, characterized the relationship
between labour and capital as one of equality. The role oflabour law,
according to him, is to strike a "political and economic compromise
between organized labour - a very powerful socio-economic force -
on the one hand, and the employers of labour - an equally powerful
socio-economic force - on the other."15l For both Mcintyre and Le
Dain JJ. (writing for the plurality), labour unions do not raise any
special concerns and cannot be differentiated, for constitutional pur-
poses, from "a wide range of associations [and] orgarnzations"'52
including, according to McIntyre J., associations of property owners,
commercial actors and gun clubs. '53
The Alberta Reference majority's approach is implicitly adopted by
the Court in this Term's decision in International Longshoreman's and
Warehouseman's Union, Canada Area Local 500 v. Canada.l54 Justice
La Forest, writing for a unanimous Court, held that on the basis of the
1<7 ld., at 419,424 and 442.
"8 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987J 1 S.C.R 313
at 334.
149 ld., at 368.
160 ld., at 366.
,., ld., at 414.
152 ld., at 390, per Le Dain J.
153 ld., at 404·5.
'64 [1994J 1 S.C.R 150.
"thrust of the reasoning applicable to s. 2(d)...adopted in earlier deci-
sions of this Court", the right to strike is not protected by section 7's
right to liberty.155 Thus, the Court held (in a half-page decision) that
back-to-work legislation does not limit section 7 of the Charter. '56
ILWU brings the record of unions seeking to protect the rights to
strike, bargain collectively and picket under the Charter to zero victo-
ries and eight losses. Many commentators have argued this is not at
all surprising given the traditional antipathy of courts to unions.157
Even those who initially held out some hope for a union-friendly Char-
ter jurisprudence seem chastened by the Court's remarkable consis-
tency in rejecting unions' claims.'ss
(c) Corporations
From its earliest decisions under the Charter, the Court has found
vexing the question of whether, and to what extent, corporations
should be protected by the Charter's rights. The case law simulta-
neously reflects the classical liberal theme offormal equality - with
substantive distinctions between real and artificial persons being
glossed over when rights protection is extended to corporations -
and the social democratic understanding that the Charter is
designed to protect "vulnerable groups" - a category that does not
include business corporations. The tension between these two
themes becomes most apparent when corporations seek to use the
Charter to attempt to deregulate their activities.
In Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney GeneraV,159 the Court was
confronted with just such a situation. A business corporation sought
declaratory standing to challenge Ontario's Retail Business Holidays
Actl60 on the ground that Sunday-closing legislation violated the Char-
ter's guarantee of freedom of religion and the right to equality. The
corporation had applied for a declaration of unconstitutionality, and
was joined in its application by its employees. '61 Consistent with its
,•• ld., at 151.
,•• The union argued that the prohibition on strikes in the Maintenance of Ports
Operations Act, 1986, S.C. 1986, c. 46, violated workers' rights to liberty by forcing
them to work under terms and conditions they did not freely choose, and by penalizing
them for withdrawing their labour at the termination of a contract.
1.7 For discussion, see Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change:
You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)" (1991), 70 Can. Bar Rev.
307 and authorities cited therein.
16. See Beatty, "Labouring Outside the Charter" (1991), 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 839.
169 119931 3 S.C.R 675.
160 RS.O. 1980, c. 453 [as am. S.O. 1989, c. 3] as it then was.
161 The civil action had been commenced only after the Attorney General of
Ontario had instituted proceedings, under s. 8 of the Act, seeking an order requiring
that Hy and Zels, Paul Magder Furs and several other retailers remain closed for
business over the Christmas holidays.
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earlier decisions in Irwin Thy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)162 and
R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,163 the Court did not grant private
standing to Hy and Zel's to challenge the legislation under section 2(a).
Yet, all the members of the Court were prepared to grant public inter-
est standing to Hy and Zel's (a for-profit corporation) if its claim was
found to meet the criteria for public interest standing established in,
Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Borowski. l64 Though the majority
judges held that the criteria were not met in the case, they were
apparently unaware that they were doing anything new or controver-
sial in suggesting a for-profit corporation could get public interest
standing.165 Absent from the majority decision is any hint of reserva-
tion or reflection about granting public interest standing to a for-profit
corporation to challenge legislation under the Charter.
Surely, it would not be unreasonable to expect somebody on the
Court to express some concern about this. Instead, in the dissenting
judgment of L'Heureux-DuM J. (McLachlin J. concurring), the
majority are criticized for not going far enough in protecting corpora-
tions under the Charter. The dissenters would have granted Hy and
Zel's private standing. In doing so, they would have exceeded the
majority in clearing the way for corporate access to the Charter.
First, L'Heureux-DuM J. argued for removal of the limitations on
corporate access established by Irwin Thy and Wholesale Travel, hold-
ing that a corporation could raise the constitutionality of a law
whether as subject of a prosecution or as applicant in a civil action.166
Second, L'Heureux-Dube J. asserted that corporations could have
rights under sections 2(a) and 15 of the Charter, thus rejecting the
significance of the difference between artificial and natural persons
for the purpose of these sections.167 The dissenters would have
162 [1989) 1 S.C.R. 927.
163 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154.
I" [1981) 2 S.C.R. 575.
165 This may be, in part, the result. of the Court's ruling last Term in Conseil du
Patronat du Quebec ITIC. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1991J 3 S.C.R. 685; revg (1988),
55 D.L.R. (4th) 523 (Que. C.A.). In this case, the Court granted standing in a cursory,
one paragraph judgment to an employer's association seeking to challenge Quebec's
prohibition on the hiring of replacement workers during a strike or lock-out. By adopt-
ing the reasoning of Chouinard J.A. in the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Court unhesi-
tatingly affirmed the right of employers to invoke the Charter to challenge a law
designed to maintain the integrity of the collective bargaining process during labour
disputes.
166 Supra, note 159, at 714.
167 This was not inconsistent, according to L'Heureux-Dulle J., with the Court's
decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, as that case had merely
decided that a corporation was entitled to raise the religious rights of others as a
defence to a criminal or quasi-criminal charge; it left open the question of "whether
corporations may have rights under s. 2(a) of the Charter" (Hy and Zel's, id., at 700).
thrown the doors of the Charter wide open to corporations, in con-
trast to the more cautious approach of the majority. What is remark-
able about both judgments is the absence of any apparent concern on
the part of the judges about the issues raised by corporate access to
judicial review under the Charter. This is perhaps all the more sur-
prising given the expression of such concerns in earlier Charter
cases,168 and the Court's continuous refrain, as we hear again in this
Term's C!0mite paritaire decision, that it shOuld be wary of attempts
by partIes to use the Charter to attack regulatory legislation espe-
cially that which protects vulnerable groupS.169 All members'of the
Court seemed unwilling to go behind the legally constructed formal
equivalence of for-profit corporations and individual actors to
address the substantive differences, that exist among social actors
seeking public interest standing.170 By failing to do this, the group to
whom public interest standing is available becomes, we would argue
overinclusively cast. . ,
The Court's blindness to the issue of who is seeking public inter-
es~ standin~ has another distressing consequence. By indirectly
domg what It should have done directly - denying public interest
standing explicitly to for-profit corporations - the Court potentially
res~cts th~ availability of such standing to public interest organi-
zations. This occurs because the majority's decision confirms, and
~erhaps fun:h:r circumscribes, the Court's strict approach to apply-
mg the pubhc mterest standing rule developed in Canadian Council
of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tionJ. 17l Kent Roach has noted that the Court's approach to the third
168 See, e.g., Irwin 1b.Y, supra, note 162.
169 An earlier version of the legislation at issue in this case had already been
upheld by the Court on this ground. See R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2
S.C.R. 713.
.176 The ~in~rity ~e<;ision exhibits a further penchant for formal equality in pre-
sum10g equalIty 10 prmclple between litigants in federalism cases and those in Char-
tf;r . cas';ls.. Justice L'Heureux-DuM adopts Peter Hogg's argument that by
dlstlOgUlshing between Charter and federalism litigants the Court has established
"~tifi~ial barrie;:s" ~ ~onstitutional challenges, offending the principle of constitu-
tionalism that a .pl~nt~ffought to be able to obtain a declaration...on the basis of any
part ofth~ C.ons~tution.~supra, note 159, at 714, quoting Hogg). The simplicity of the
stated pnnclple IS begUIling, for we see a fundamental distinction between Charter
and federali~m.liti~ati.on t?a~merits limiting the availability of standing in Charter
cases. The dlsti~ctl~n IS thiS: 10 ~ederalism cases, only one level of government is pre-cl.u~ed ~om legislating on a particular subject; the other level of government, by defi-
m~on, .IS ~ot. In Charter cases, both levels of government are disabled fromleglsla~n~ m ways that unreasonably limit Charter rights and freedoms. Given the
more slgmfic~t consequences that flow from a declaration of invalidity under the
Charter, stand109 ought to be more carefully circumscribed.
171 [1992]1 S.C.R. 236.
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criterion for public interest standing - that there is no other rea-
sonable and effective way to bring the issue before the court - is
more strictly applied in Hy and Zel's than it was in Canadian Coun-
cil of Churches because of its requirement that "a party seeking to
challenge the Act must show there is no other reasonable and effec-
tive means of bringing the matter before the court.,,172 Not only is ,
this burden extremely difficult to meet, but, arguably, it restricts
public interest standing only to those applicants who seek to chal-
lenge laws and regulations (like those in Thorson v. Canada (Attor-
ney General))'73 that have no direct effect on anybody. True, these
strictures will serve to keep many private corporations from using
the Charter, but they will have the same effect on organizations
seeking Charter protection for vulnerable groups. Ajurisprudence of
public interest standing that truly reflected the Court's concern that
the Charter operate to protect vulnerable groups would be sensitive
to actual distinctions between different kinds of individuals, groups
, and organizations seeking Charter protection. By failing to recog-
nize this important distinction, the Court credits both an overinclu-
sive standard, - allowing for-profit corporate access - and an
underinclusive application of that standard - potentially denying
access to organizations representing public interests.
Peterborough (City) v. Ramsden/74 too, is an example ofthe overin-
elusiveness problem. Arguably, Peterborough enhances the capacity
of those with few resources to exercise their freedom of expression
rights, but, we will suggest, it does the same for those with many
resources. The Court has made it elear in a series of cases that corpo-
rations have freedom of expression interests and can rely directly on
section 2(b) to challenge legislation. Nothing in Peterborough sug-
gests that corporations would not be able to avail themselves offree-
dom of expression rights on public property. More than that,
however, the Court in Peterborough put a gloss on its decision in
Irwin Thy that may serve to expand corporate freedom of expression
rights under the Charter. In Irwin Thy, the Court held that a content-
neutral law (one whose purpose is not to restrict a particular mean-
ing) that has the effect of limiting expression, does not constitute a
limit on section 2(b) unless the particular content of the expression
being limited "promotes at least one of [the] principles [underlying
172 Supra, note 159, at 693 (emphasis added). See Roach, Constitutional Remedies
in Canada (1994), at 5-13. See also the discussion in Ross, "Further Restrictions on
Access to Charter Review: A Comment on By and Zels Inc. v. Ontario (AG)" (1994), 5
Constitutional Forum 22 at 24.
173 [1975J 1 S.C.R. 138.
t1. [19931 2 S.C.R. 1084.
freedom of expressionl."175 If we combine this with the Court's sev-
eral indications that the content of purely commercial advertising
may not promote or serve these principles,'76 then it might follow
that purely commercial advertising would only with difficulty
receive section 2(b) protection from content-neutral laws.177 That
was the logic, at least until Peterborough.
Peterborough effectively puts a gloss on Irwin Thy in a way that
may serve to provide commercial advertisers wide section 2(b) pro-
tection from content-neutral laws. The gloss is as follows. Irwin Thy
suggests that the correct question for the Court to have asked in
Peterborough was: Does the content of Mr. Ramsden's expression _
advertising an upcoming performance of his band - promote any of
the three values underlying freedom of expression? The Court in
Peterborough, however, asked a very different question: Does the
form of Mr. Ramsden's expression - postering - promote any of
those values? Based on the Court's earlier decisions, the answer to
the first question might have been "no". The second question, how-
ever, frees the Court from its earlier analyses of commercial adver-
tising by shifting the inquiry from content (commercial advertising)
to form (postering), thus making it easier for the Court to draw a
link between Mr. Ramsden's activities and the values underlying
.". The Court adopts (id., at 1104) the following example and passage from
Irw.m Thy, supra, note 162, at 976-77: if an individual is charged for shouting under
a City by-law that prohibits excessive noise-making, she would not be able to claim
her section 2(b) rights had been limited unless she could "show that her aim [in
shouting] was to convey a meaning reflective of the principles underlying freedom of
expression."
1,. Refer~ng to dentists who wished to advertise their services, for example, the
Court states In Rocket v. Royal College orDental Surgeons ofOntario, [1990J 2 S.C.R.
232 at 247: "Their motive for doing so is, in most cases, primarily economic. Con-
versely, their loss, if prevented from doing so, is merely loss of profit, and not loss of
opp~rtunitr to p~ticipate i,?, t~e political process or the 'marketplace of ideas', or to
r~al1ze one s spmtual or artistic self-fulfillment". In Reference re Criminal Code, Sec-
ttons I~3 a"4 195.1(1)(c), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1136, Dickson C.J. suggests that
expression WIth an economic purpose does not "lie at, or even near, the core of the
gu~anteeof freedom of expression." In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 760, he
p.omted out that it can be "destructive of free expression values...to treat all expres-
sIOn as equally crucial to those principles at the core of s. 2(b)." In that decision he
finds (at 766) that hate propaganda "contributes little" to the promotion of these val-
ues and "strays some distance from the spirit ofs. 2(b)". For an earlier and somewhatcontr,~view, see Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [19881 2 S.C.R. 7't2.
Such a result would be perfectly consistent with the Irwin Thy and Rocket
ca~es, where the legislation in issue was not content-neutral, but was aimed at regu-
lating commercial advertising with a particular content. The Court has insisted in
these and other cases that where legislation in its purp~se restricts a particular kind
of expression it will limit section 2(b) even where the expression does not serve any of
the values underlying freedom ofexpression. See also R. v. Keegstra, id.
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section 2(b). Postering, as a form of communication, the Court
pointed out, has historically served at least one of those values - the
communication of information that "fosters social and political deci-
sion-making"178 - and Mr. Ramsden's section 2(b) rights were there-
fore limited by the postering ban. Contrary to the Court's approach in
Irwin 1by, the content of his expression is simply not a relevant issue.
This shift from analysis of specific content to analysis of general form'
represents a potential expansion of the scope of section 2(b) protec-
tion for commercial advertisers.179 Under the Peterborough approach
they need only establish that the form of eXpression prohibited by a
content-neutral law could convey a message whose content advances
freedom of expression values and that law will be found to limit sec-
tion 2(b) and be struck down, as was the law in Peterborough itself, if
it does not meet the section 1 criteria.
2. Identifying Vulnerable Groups
(a) Gender and Class
Treatment of vulnerable groups is not always as straightforward
as our discussion to this point implies. In particular, determination of
what the vulnerable group ·at issue is or whether, in fact, there is
indeed a vulnerable group involved is often a tricky question with
highly variable answers. This is in part due to the interplay of privi-
lege and disadvantage that characterizes our social and economic
world, granting individuals cross-cutting, shifting, and multiple
group identities. The result of such interactive and various group
affiliation means that the selection of an operative group identity for
individuals who figure before the court in constitutional actions
(either as claimants or parties otherwise affected by the state action
in question) is a difficult, necessarily simplistic, and artificial exer-
cise. 18O The consequences that flow from the identification ofthe rele-
vant presence of a vulnerable group in anyone case are thus
dependent upon a somewhat arbitrary and certainly political pro-
cess. The result of this analytical fact is that, while the Court
expresses on numerous occasions great sensitivity to the existence of
social, economic, and political vulnerability, its recognition of the
178 Supra, note 174, at 1101, 1105.
17. And others, like hate mongers, whose speech has been found by the Court not
to serve the purposes underlying section 2(b). See R. v. Keegstra, supra, note 176.
180 For a lengthier discussion of this claim, see Philipps and Young, "Sex, Tax, and
the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau v. The Queen" (1995), 2 Rev. of Constitutional
Studies 221.
group interests that implicate these concerns in anyone case is far
from uncontestable and unimportant.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in cases involving the protec-
tions offered by section 15 ofthe Charter. Here, ofcourse, the Supreme
COurt181 has established that vulnerability of the group affected by the
state action in question, in terms of which the claimant is categoriz-
able, is a prerequisite to a finding of discrimination. This results sim-
ply from the fact that vulnerability will always be true of a group that
meets the requirement of being historically disadvantaged and stig-
matized, the last stage of the Andrews test.182 Through such a require-
ment, the Court·has built into section 15 a selective problematization
of state action. And underlying such a restriction on the potential use
of section 15 is the image of an often benevolent, and therefore not
immediately suspect, state. The concern is, however, that in its zeal to
so focus the impact of section 15, the Court has given insufficient
explicit consideration to the inevitable shortcomings of the categoriza-
tion process such an analysis invokes. Instead, the move away from
the earlier "similarly situated test" has been falsely celebrated in
cases like Andrews as an end to the "categorization game".18S What the
Court fails to acknowledge is that the problem of categorization is still
with us and that this problem has specific consequences for the issue
ofvulnerable groups and the Charter.
A strong illustration of the general points made above arises in
Symes u. Canada, a decision involving a challenge to provisions of
the Income ThxAct!ll4 In this case, the appellant, a full-time partner
in a law firm, argued that the wages she paid to a child-care giver
were deductible as business expenses under sections 9 and 18 of the
Income Tax Act. She relied on two specific claims to make her argu-
ment. First, she claimed that child care expenses constituted legiti-
mate business expenses: the employment of a nanny enabled Symes
to engage in an income-producing business. If this interpretation of
business expenses were denied, her second claim was that such a
limited understanding of business expenses had a disparate nega-
tive impact on women and thus infringed the gender equality guar-
antee of section 15 of the Charter.
181 See Andrews v. Law Soci2ty ofBritish Columbia, [1989]1 S.C.R 143; and R. v.
TUrpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
182 Justice Iacobucci summarizes this test in Symes v. Canada, [1993) 4 S.C.R
695.
183 Per MacIntyre J. in Andrews v. Law Soci2ty ofBritish Columbia, supra, note.
181 at 168, quoting Kerans J.A. in Mahe v. Alberta (1987), 54 Alta. L.R (2d) 212 at
244.
184 RS.C. 1952, c. 148 [as am. S.C. 1970-71-72. c. 63], as it then was.
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The Court did not accept Symes' initial claim. Instead, it found
that section 63, by establishing a separate system for deductions of
child care expenses (up to a maximum of $2,000 per child in 1985)
effectively precluded any other deductibility.18s Thus the Court
moved on to consider Symes' constitutional challenge to the limita-
tion imposed on her ability to deduct the full amount of expenses she ,
had incurred for the care of her two children (over $13,000 in 1985).
In dealing with this second question, Iacobucci J. (writing for the
majority ofthe Court) began with the problem the facial neutrality of
section 63 raised for Symes' claim. The provision distinguished
explicitly only between persons who incur child care expenses with
respect to an eligible child and those who do not, thus forcing Symes
to establish that section 63, in its effects, draws a distinction on the
basis of sex. Symes was unable to do this. Thus, it was in relation to
the first step of the Andrews test - the necessity of showing differen-
tial treatment on the ground claimed - that Symes' constitutional
claim failed. It failed because Iacobucci J., while easily recognizing
that women disproportionately bear the social costs of child care,
refused to carry the analysis one step further and conclude that
women disproportionately bear the economic costs of child care. And
since the only possible effect of section 63 is to limit the tax deduction
available with respect to financial expenses, this section can only
affect women disproportionately at all if women are those who pay
the economic costs: "social costs, although very real, exist outside of
the Act."186
Unwilling to extrapolate from the disproportionate social burden
child care imposes on women, Iacobucci J. denied the very interlink-
age of social, economic, and political consequences that adverse effect
discrimination acknowledges and targets. After all, what adverse
effect discrimination recognizes is that certain social characteristics
are when looked at in context, so closely associated with other char-
act~ristics that treatment with respect to the one set of characteris-
tics has to be understood as treatment in terms of the other. It
acknowledges that group characteristics have a variety of social and
economic consequences. For example, clustered with gender is a wide
range of associated behaviours and circumstances, such as preg-
nancy, child care responsibilities and vulnerability to harassment.
186 Justice L'Heureux-DuM, in dissent, reccgnized the bias in favour of a tradi-
tionally male practice of business found in the deduction provisions of the Act. As a
result, she held (supra, note 182, at 808) that section 63 does not limit deductibility of
child care expenses under other relevant ,sections.
186 ld., at 765.
Revealing new linkages and thus problematizing seemingly neutral
distinctions is what equality theory at its best does. Thus, Iacobucci
J.'s refusal to make the leap from social burden to economic burden
restricts the necessary flexible range adverse effect doctrine tells us
we must import into any equality analysis. Contrast this with L'Heu-
reux-Dube J.'s statement that the inference from social burden to
economic costs was "inescapable".'87
Justice Iacobucci's refusal to find such economic consequences for
women is closely dependant upon his categorization of the groups he
sees as involved in Symes' claim. In the case before him, the parents
did not equally share the costs of child care: Symes bore the economic
costs. Yet, Iacobucci J. gave more relevance to the observation that, for-
mally, parents have joint legal responsibility for child care expenses.ISS
The consequence ofthis selective privileging of the formal legal picture
over Symes' actual circumstances is that, for this portion of Iacobucci
J.'s argument, Symes is implicitly yet effectively denied any represen-
tative status in relation to the more general category ofwomen: her cir-
cumstances remain individual and discrete, ungeneralizable beyond
the particulars ofher own situation. Thus Iacobucci J. wrote:
[Tlhe "family decision" made by the appellant and her husband is not
mandated by law and public policy....In most households involving more
than one supporting person, therefore, regardless of "family decisions",
the law will impose the legal duty to share the burden of child care
expenses....189
When Iacobucci J. did deal explicitly with the question of representa-
tion, Symes was allowed only a limited representative status. She
was confined to a subgroup of women: married women who are
entrepreneurs. She could not speak for women generally but only for
this more limited and relatively privileged subgroup. And the ine-
quality her claim then addresses is circumvented by Iacobucci J.'s
refusal to infer economic burden from social burden for the group of
women she represents. Justice L'Heureux-Dube in her dissent con-
demned such a confinement of Symes' equality claim, arguing that:
"The fact that Ms. Symes may be a member of a more privileged eco-
nomic class does not by itself invalidate her claim under s. 15 of the
Charter...we cannot 'hold every woman to the position of the most
disadvantaged women, apparently in the name of sex equality'.,,190
181 ld., at 821.
"8 ld., at 764.
189 ld" at 764 (emphasis in original).
190 ld" at 825-26.
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Frustratingly, Iacobucci J. recognized to some extent the validity
of Symes' complaints about section 63. Had Symes led evidence as to
the effect of the tax provisions on single mothers, Iacobucci J.
allowed that she might have been able to establish the constitutional
claim: "In my view, if it were possible in another case to prove that s.
63 of the Act caused an adverse effect for some subgroup ofwomen, s.
63 would be discriminatory on the basis of sex..."191 In support of such'
a proposition, Iacobucci J. reiterated the conclusion from Brooks v.
Canada Safeway Ltd. 192 and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. 193 that
an adverse effect felt only by a subgroup ofwomen can still constitute
sex-based discrimination. 194 Justice Iacobucci accepted that women
from this latter category may be more likely than men to head single-
parent households, thus leaving open the possibility that child care
expenses could be shown to disproportionately fall upon these
women. But, again, Symes has been categorized out of the "equality
loop" and thus this other equality angle is not before the Court.
The effect of these conclusions about Symes' group membership is
that Symes became unable to cast herself as a member of a disadvan-
taged group. This is not necessarily a distressing result. Section 15,
as given flesh by Wilson J. particularly in Andrews and Turpin, does
not have as its purpose the redress of all forms ofunequal treatment.
But, this assessment is less appealing when the group whose equal-
ity claim is at stake has important elements of disadvantage present
in its identity.
What happens in Symes illustrates an important aspect of equal-
ity analysis and group membership. The categorization chosen to
represent the claimant's group membership is critical to the ultimate
success of the claimant's challenge. Because equality is a compara-
tive concept, categorization - identification of the groups between
whom comparison will take place - is an inevitable component of
any analysis. And because ofthe great variety ofpossible group iden-
tities for anyone individual, this exercise is, as already mentioned,
inevitably political. The result of such variable categorization possi-
bilities means that for equality claims, where the social dimension at
issue occurs associated with a number of other social relations, the
Court will have some choice as to how to characterize the claimant's
concern. Symes' case is such an instance as her claim of gender dis-
tinction clearly maps onto, in relation to section 63, concerns that
191 Id., at 770.
192 (1987) 1 S.C.R. 1219.
19> [1989) 1 S.C.R. 1252.
19. Supra, note 182, at 769.
also implicate family status and class. Justice Iacobucci noted this195
and went on to isolate Symes' claim to one involving businesswomen
only, thus emphasizing Symes' class membership at the expense of
her gender representativeness.
Commentators have picked up on the implications of this interac-
tion between gender and class in Symes' situation, arguing that
Symes' class gives her a perspective on child care issues that is, in
the long run, damaging to general equity struggles in this area.196
JustiCe Iacobucci was not unaware of these larger politics. He men-
tioned that, had a section 1 analysis been necessary, section 63
would have had to be considered in relation to the government's
overall response to child care needs.197 But, by narrowing Symes'
claim to one representative of only businesswomen, Iacobucci J. pre-
empted the fuller equality analysis - a stage necessarily prior to the
kind ofbalancing section 1 dictates.
Symes highlights the limited remedial scope of constitutional equal-
ity rights. Forced to remedy inequalities between identifiable sub-
groups, considered in the abstract from the larger injustices framing
the situation, constitutional equality analysis allows only for tinker-
ing with, and not a re-working of, existing patterns of income distribu-
tion. Had Symes been successful, as L'Heureux-Dube J. noted, an
important inequality existing between businesswomen and business-
men would have been acknowledged. Yet, the elements of class ine-
quality, gendered division of labour, devaluation of child care work -
all of which function to construct a much larger and more disturbing
general picture - would lie unaddressed and possibly exacerbated.
Justice Iacobucci ended his section 15 discussion with the impor-
tant observation that an adverse effect gender discrimination claim
is not defeated by establishing that both men and women are nega-
tively affected by the action in question. It is important, Iacobucci J.
asserted, to realize "that there is a difference between being able to
point to individuals negatively affected by a provision, and being able
to prove that a group or subgroup is suffering an adverse effect in law
by virtue of an impugned provision."'96 That is, the different back-
ground conditions that pertain for each gender will mean that simi-
lar treatment of men and of women will be viewed differently by
equality law. The result is that despite any overlap, "disadvantage
19. Id., at 767-68.
196 See Macklin, "Symes u. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class" (1992), 5 C.J.W.L.
498; and Young, "Case Comment on Symes u. The Queen", (1991) Brit. Tax Rev. 105.
197 Supra, note 182, at 773.
198 Id., at 770-71 (emphasis in original).
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[cannot] be located for both men and women at the same time."l99
One can impute to this aside a recognition of the indeterminacy of
all group distinctions. Even gender, a distinction culturally imbued
with strong claims to natural determinacy, cannot be captured by a
determinate set of characteristics that clearly situates and describes
all individuals. Thus gender-based distinctions ought not to be
denied merely because they affect some individuals who are not'
members of the targeted gender. To fail to recognize this, given the
nature of group identification, would be to undermine the possibility
of any meaningful doctrine of adverse effect discrimination.
(b) Disability
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General)200 provides fur-
ther illustration of some of the difficulties in the Court's approach to
issues of social power and vulnerability. The facts of the case are well
known. Sue Rodriguez suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(AMS), a disease that causes rapid physical deterioration followed by
death. Rodriguez planned to end her life when the symptoms became
so unbearable that it was no longer worth living. She knew she
would require assistance to do so since, by that time, she would be
severely disabled. The only obstacle to this plan was the Criminal
Code's prohibition of one person assisting another to commit sui-
cide.201 Rodriguez challenged this provision under sections 7, 12 and
15 of the Charter. A majority of the Court, in a rather curious judg-
ment by Sopinka J., held that none of these provisions was via-
lated.202 We will focus here on how Sopinka J. characterized the
plight of Sue Rodriguez, as this is the key to his reasons for holding
that the ban on assisted suicide offends neither section 7's principles
of fundamental justice nor section I's minimal impairment test.203
199 Id., at 771,
200 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519.
201 R.S.C. 1985, c. C.46, s. 241(b).
2112 We say "curious' for several reasons. One of which - the reliance on "social
consensus' - is mentioned above. Two others are, first, the majority's running together
of the "basic tenets of the legal system" and the "manifest unfairness" tests for defin·
ing the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7. The former is developed in R. v.
Jones, [1986) 2 S.C,R. 284 and applied by Beetz J. and Dickson C.J. in R. v. Morgen·
taler, [1988) 1 S.C,R. 30; the latter is developed in Section 94(2) of th£ Motor Vehicle
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c, 288, [19851 2 S.C.R. 486 and also applied by Dickson C.J. in R v.
Morgentaler, supra. A second example is Sopinka J.'8 unwillingness to consider
whether s. 15(1) is limited by the ban on assisted suicide on the ground that even ifit
is the ban can be upheld under s. 1.
203 The latter is engaged by the majority's assuming in arguendo that the ban on
assisted suicide limits 5. 15(1).
, i
Justice Sopinka defined the purpose of the ban on assisted suicide
as "the protection of the vulnerable who might be induced in
moments ofwealmess to commit suicide."204 And, the question posed
in each of the section 7 and section 1 analyses was essentially the
same: Is a blanket ban on assisted suicide necessary for achieving
this purpose? The dissenting judges said no. For them, the vulnera-
ble group contemplated by the purpose of the ban could not include
Rodriguez - a terminally ill, mentally competent person with two to
14 months to live, whose future was inevitably one of unbearable
suffering and incapacity to end her own life. Given her circum-
stances, according to the dissenting judges, it was difficult to con-
ceive of her choice to end her life as the product of inducement in a
moment ofweakness.205 Unfortunately, the majority judgment never
met this point head on. Instead, it slid back and forth between re-
characterizing the vulnerable group that needs legislative protection
as all people who are terminally ill,206 thus including Rodriguez as a
terminally ill person; and re-characterizing the purpose of the legis-
lation in terms of the general principle of "sanctity of human life", a
principle that requires people be forbidden from intentionally ending
the lives of others and that therefore proscribes assisted suicide.207
Each characterization enabled the majority to argue that the blan-
ket ban on assisted suicide is necessary to achieve the legislative
objective; neither came close to capturing the reality of Sue Rod-
riguez's plight. .
The majority's judgment was a remarkable example of the
abstraction and unreality that often characterize judicial reasoning
under the Charter. The majority's analysis effectively made Sue Rod-
riguez invisible. Either she was lumped together with all terminally
people, including those, unlike herself, who may be mentally incom-
petent, not suffering unbearably, or not disabled from taking their
own lives; or she was defined as a member of the general population
who must be protected by legal prohibition from others who would
2M Supra, note 200, at 595 (5•.7 analysis), adopted at 613 for s. 1 analysis.
205 The minority judges would have held that s. 241(b) was overbroad and should
not apply to Rodriguez and others in similar situations. The dissenting judges were:
Lamer C.J. (who found a violation of s. 15), L'Heureux-Oube and McLachlin JJ. (who
found a violation of 5. 7), and Cory J. (who agreed with all of his dissenting col·
leagues).
206 Supra, note 200, at, e.g., 586 and 614.
207 The mlijority draws a distinction between the active ending of a life (of which
it views assisted suicide as an example) and passively allowing for life to end, as is the
case in palliative care. For a critique of this and other aspects of the majority's deci-
sion, see Jackman, "Solutions in Science Outside the Law? Rodriguez v. British
Columbia (A. OJ" (1994), 17 Oal. L.J. 206.
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end her life.208 Yet, her real vulnerability, contrary to the majority's
construction, was not to those who might take her life, but to those
who would force her to live; her fear was not that she would be
induced to end her life in a moment of weakness, but that she would
be forced to face the horrors of life because the law prohibits people
from helping her end her life when she is too weak to do it herself..
The majority's failure to grasp this point is all the more curious given
its acknowledgement of the uniquely horrendous circumstances of
Rodriguez's life, and its conclusion that the ban on assisted suicide
"deprives the appellant of autonomy over her person and causes her
physical pain and psychological stress in a manner which impinges
on the security of her person".209 The majority's inability to respond
to Sue Rodriguez's reality illustrates just how abstract and unreal
constitutional discourse can be.
One further interesting point arises in regard to a themewe devel-
oped earlier. An unintended result of the majority's decision in Rod-
riguez may be to confirm fears about an expanded role for
corporations in Charter review. Rather than engaging in the more
specific inquiry of whether the provisions of the Criminal Code pro-
hibiting assisted suicide are overbroad by implicating the mentally
competent but terminally ill patient, such as Sue Rodriguez, the
majority inquired into the larger question, asking whether the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice have "evolved" such that they conflict
with the balancing of interests by Parliament. This latter question
was answered by ascertaining whether a "new consensus has
emerged in society" supporting a substantive right to assisted sui-
cide. Rather than confining itself to the narrower question of proce-
dural arbitrariness posed by McLachlin J. in dissent - the same
question also posed by a majority of the Court in Morgentaler - the
majority tested the law -against a substantive standard of review,
premised upon the view that the principles of fundamental justice
are those "upon which there is some consensus that they are vital or
fundamental to our societal notion of justice" ,210 We can think of no
better example for which a court likely would find evidence of soci-
etal consensus (given the ideological bent of the judiciary) than the
principles of freedom of contract and private property. When com-
203 In discussing the sanctity of human life as an underlying legislative purpose,
the Court refers to protection from violence and the policy against capital punishme~t
as examples of laws with that purpose. The implication of subsuming s. 241~b).to th.ls
purpose is those who assist in suicide are, at least for the purpose of that pnnclple, In
the same class as murderers or executioners.
209 Supra, note 200, at 589.
210 ld., at 590.
bined with the decision in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,2ll where
a corporation was entitled to avail itself of section 7 in a criminal
prosecution, and the minority decision in Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario
(Attorney General),212 which supported the expansion of corporate
standing in civil cases, we can discern an inertia developing in
favour of the substantive protection of corporate economic interests.
Whether this indeed will occur remains to be seen, but the doctrinal
elements for such a move appear to be almost in place.
V. THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE
We turn now to the fourth and last conception of the state which
we see represented in the Court's constitutional discourse. This con-
ception can be characterized as "neo-liberal", a term that captures
the radical shift in the functions of the state associated with the rise
of global capital. This shift is exemplified by the state's retreat from
its social welfare function. Founded primarily upon Keynesian
notions, welfarism recognized the state's legitimate role in temper-
ing the effects of the marketplace by redistributing wealth, facilitat-
ing collective bargaining, and encouraging and managing economic
development.213 The social welfare function now is seen as inconsis-
tent with a transnational economy no longer tied to local labour mar-
kets. With the assistance of new technologies, economic actors are
able to generate profits by internationalizing production. Businesses
simply identify the most cost-efficient location for the production of
any particular component in an organizational enterprise.214 This
suggests that economic regulation by the nation state is obsolete -
capital simply flees or evades jurisdictions that inhibit the accumu-
lation of maximum profits. With its supervisory role in the economy
hindered, the nation state is viewed as no longer able to influence its
own economic development.216
The social democratic ideals and arrangements that characterized
post-World War II political economy are increasingly portrayed in
dominant discourse as outdated, unrealistic and inflexible. "New-
ness" and "change" are the buzzwords justifying the movement of
2U (1991) 3 S.C.R. 154.
212 [1993) 3 S.C.R. 675.
213 See the discussion in Marchuk, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the
Restructuring ofGlobal Markets (1991), at 3-4.
21< What Reich calls "organizational webs". See Reich, The Work ofNations: Pre-
paring Ourselues for 21st-Century Capitalism (1991), at 112.
216 Miyoshi, "A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the
Decline of the Nation-State" (Summer 1993),19 Critical Inquiry 726.
~ '/
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economic policy in a rightward direction, and those who have reser-
vations about the effect of these shifts on social justice issues are dis-
missed as out of touch. It should not be surprising that the Court has
picked up on this neo-liberal enthusiasm for newness and change,
despite the tension between these views and its social democratic
ones. In Alberta Reference, for example (referentially incorporatel;l
into this Term's ILWlP16 case), McIntyre J. noted that "[g]reat
changes - economic, social and industrial - are afoot.. .. [there is]
great pressure to. reassess the traditional approaches to economic
and industrial questions, including questions of labour law and pol-
icy."217Accordingly, in his view, it would have been wrong to const;itu-
tionalize strikes and collective bargaining.
A most persistent neo-liberal theme has been that of "free trade".
States are being pressured to remove impediments to trade, inter-
nally and externally, in the name of productivity and competition.
Regional trading agreements, such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement, are designed to "harmonize" trading rules and
facilitate freer trade. The constraints that NAFTA, and its underly-
ing ideology, places on state parties leads to a corresponding phenom-
enon of deregulation. In Canadian federalism these themes are
manifest in the movement towards freer trade within Canada - one
that is deregulatory in the sense that it necessarily. imposes restric-
tions on the power of provinces to regulate. In 1991, for example, the
federal government proposed amendments to section 121 of the Con-
stitution that would have guaranteed the free movement of goods,
services, persons and capital and barred constitutionally a myriad of
provincial non-tarriff barriers to trade. These proposals were made,
the Government of Canada argued, "in light of continuing trade lib-
eralization and accelerating globalization of markets."218 Though
these proposals were not successful, their terms are manifest in
recently negotiated agreements among the federal and provincial
governments.
The Court's decision this Term in Hunt v. T&N PLC219 provides an
interesting example of the Court's readiness to adopt neo-liberal
..6 International Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union, Canada Area
Local 500 v. Canada, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 150.
217 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [19871 1 S.C.R. 313
at 414.
218 Government of Canada, Canadian Federalism and Economic Union: Partner-
ship for Prosperity (1991), at 20. These proposals are discussed in Schneiderman, "The
Market and the Constitution" in Cameron and Smith (eds.), Constitutional Politics
(1992).
21. 11993] 4 S.C.R. 289.
themes in justifying its constitutional decisions. At issue was a Que-
bec statute - what is called typically a "blocking statute" - that
prohibited, inter alia, the removal of documents of business entities
in Quebec that are required to be produced in judicial proceedings
outside of the province. Such statutes are common to both Quebec
and Ontario and were originally intended as a shield against anti-
trust prosecutions in the U.S. The Quebec-based companies are
alleged to have conspired to cover up negligently manufactured
products that exposed the appellant, George Hunt, and other work-
ers to asbestos fibres. The companies at first resisted the litigation
by attempting to strike out the claim, then shareholders sought suc-
cessfully an order under section 4 of the Business Concerns Records
Act220 preventing the production of documents from the Quebec
headquarters.
The appellant argued that either the law was ultra vires the
province or, in the alternative, was constitutionally inapplicable as
it applied to other provinces "under the principles set forth by this
Court in Morguard".221 In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De
Savoye/22 La Forest J. for the Court held that a British Columbia
court was required to enforce a default judgment obtained in
Alberta. In reaching that decision he adopted neo-liberal themes,
noting that the rules of private international law were "grounded
in the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills
and people across state lines in a fair and orderly manner."223
According to LaForest J: "the business community operates in a
world economy and we correctly speak of a world community even
in the face of decentralized political and legal power. Accommodat-
ing the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines has now
become imperative."224
Morguard, La Forest J. noted, was not argued on constitutional
grounds. But the constitutional status of the rule, requiring the rec-
ognition of default judgments where there is a real and substantial
connection to the jurisdiction where judgment was obtained, contin-
ued to be debated.226 This puzzlement seemed reasonable, given that
220 RS.Q. 1977, c. D-12, s. 4 lam. 1988, c. 21, s. 661.
221 Supra, note 219, at 307,
222 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 10n
223 Id., at 1096.
22< Id., at 1098.
... See, for example, Black, "The Other Side ofMorguard: New Limits on Judicial
Jurisdiction" (1993), 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 4; Edinger, "Morguard v. De Savoye: Subse-
quent Developments" (1993), 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 29; and Hogg, Constitutional Low of
Canada (3rd ed. 1992), at 335,
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the. ruling in Morguard referred to constitutional principles226 and
read into Canadian law what other jurisdictions, such as the United
States, have expressly provided for.227 In Hunt, there is no longer any
doubt - La Forest J. described the considerations in Morguard as
"constitutional imperatives". The "'integrating character of our con-
stitutional arrangements as they apply to interprovincial mobility'.
calls for the courts in each province to give 'full faith and credit' to
the judgments of the courts of sister provinces." This, writes La For-
est J., "is inherent in the structure of the Canadian federation, and,
as such, is beyond the power of provincial legislatures to override.,,226
The Court relied upon neo-liberal themes in finding the blocking
statute was "constitutionally inapplicable" to the B.C. proceedings.
Justice La Forest acknowledged the law likely was made in relation
to property and civil rights; but this constitutional foundation had to
be balanced with the law's extraterritorial effect and examined in
light ofthe regime oflegal interdependence found in the Constitution
Act, 1867. Weighing into the equation some of the same consider-
ations he identified in Morguard - the intentions of the framers as
evinced by the fact of common citizenship, interprovincial mobility
rights, the common market, and the unitary structure of the court
system - La Forest J. found the Quebec law should not be available
to shield Quebec defendants and impede litigation elsewhere.
Although the province is entitled to legislate to protect property
within the province, it would run counter to the principle of the
comity of nations, and "it discourages international commerce
and...conduct of litigation."m Taking into account that the statute
did not allow for any exceptions and that Ontario (having a similar
blocking statute) and Quebec are the home to many of Canada's larg-
est corporations, application of the law would force litigants to com-
mence suits in only Ontario or Quebec, or in multiple fora.230 This
would result in "higher transactional costs for interprovincial trans-
actions [and] constitute an infringement on the unity and efficiency
ofthe Canadian marketplace...as well as unfairness to the citizen.,,231
22. See supra, note 222, at 1101, where La Forest J. wrote: "In short, the rules of
comity or private international law as they apply between the provinces must be
shaped to conform to the federal structure of the Constitution."
227 See the "full faith and credit clause" in Art. IV; s. 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
228 Supra, note 219, at 324 (emphasis added). This is no small matter for provin-
cial jurisdiction. As Joost Blom argues, this would "at one stroke invalidate a good part
of the common law provinces' current jurisdictional practice" as well as negate the
narrower rule applicable in the province of Quebec. See Blom, "Case Comment:
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye" (1991), Can. Bar Rev. 733 at 745.
229 ld., at 327.
23. ld at 330
231 Ii' .
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What is striking is the weight that the Court places on constitu-
tional structure, without grounding its analysis within the actual
text of the Constitution, particularly in the division of powers. If
blocking statutes - which target foreign legal proceedings - are
constitutionally inapplicable, then they are drained, at least within
Canada, of all force and effect. Should rules for the recognition of
extraprovincial legal proceedings, then, bean exclusive matter for
Parliament? If it is "beyond the power of the provincial legislatures"
to depart from the standards for recognition ofjudgments outlined in
Morguard, presumably the same result follows in Hunt. The excep-
tional nature of the Court's ruling is made plain by its departure
from the traditional model of federalism adjudication - policing
jurisdictional boundaries with reference to sections 91 and 92.232 The
Court fashions a standard out of its understanding of constitutional
structure and context (but without any apparent textual bases in
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867) against which pro-
vinciallaws are to be tested and which "is beyond the power of the
provincial legislatures to override.',233 The standard operates in
much the same way as a revived or revised section 121 may operate;
it couJd disable government from legislating in ways that inhibit the
flow of persons, services and capital across provincial borders. If this
is the case, it may be that the federal government also is prevented
from inhibiting market flows, as has been suggested in regard to sec-
tion 121.234 .
Although the decision applies expressly only as between the
Canadian provinces, the Court intimated that it may have applica-
tion beyond interprovincial disputes.235 In an era in which "numer-
ous transactions...spill over the borders defining legal communities
in our decentralized world legal order, there must also be a workable
method of coordinating this diversity"236 without discouraging "inter-
232 The remedy in this case also is exceptional. Constitutional inapplicability, a
version of "reading down", has emerged as a remedy where the interjurisdictional
immunity doctrine is invoked to protect core areas of federal jurisdiction from even
incidental provincial encroachment. In such case3, provincial laws yield to matters at
the heart of federal jurisdiction to promote the exclusivity of s. 91 powers. While La
Forest J. does hint briefly at the existence of a hitherto unrecognized federal power in
relation to the enforcement of judgments (id., at 326), he does not base the holding of
inapplicability explicitly on the need to preserve the exclusivity of any such power.
Instead, the remedy appears to be dictated by principles of fairness and the structure
of Canadian federalism.
233 ld., at 324.
234 See Laskin C.J. in Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
1198.
'" Supra, note 219, at 296.
230 ld., at 295.
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national commerce",237 wrote La Forest J. In Amchem Products Inc.
l). British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), decided last
Term, Sopinka J. similarly found support for his ruling in the
"increase offree trade and the rapid growth ofmultinational corpora-
tions".238 Coupled with the realization that the ruling in Morguard
has been of significant benefit to mostly U.S. judgment creditors,239 it,
is apparent that the Court is willing to nudge Canadian federalism
in a neo-liberal direction, consistent with, and surely influenced by,
the political and economic restructuring resulting from NAFTA.
The victim of that restructuring will be provincial regulatory
capacity. The more the Court sees provincial economic laws and regu-
lations as obstacles to domestic and foreign business activity, the less
likely the Court will continue to vindicate provincial areas of juris-
diction and police the limits of federal jurisdiction. It may be that
domestic and international pressures, including the constraining
effects of NAFTA, will make less likely the enactment of laws that
impede transnational market activity and lead to fewer challenges
such as that in Hunt. But for those provincial governments who have
indicated a willingness to resist constitutionally the levelling effects
of NAFTA, the Court's ruling does not bode well for their success. It
suggests that the Constitution, as understood through the neo-lib-
eral gaze, may be part of the problem, not the solution.
Hunt demonstrates how neo-liberal ideology structures the Court's
justificatory discourse about what it is doing in relation to economic
regulation. Neo-liberalism also describes the perceived politico-eco-
nomic reality of contemporary Canada, and therefore the context in
which the Court's decisions operate. "Privatization" is a major part of
neo-liberal ideology'and practice, along with free trade and deregula-
tion. As the state continues to pullout of the provision of services,
privatizing its operations, it is worth asking how this will affect the
operation of remedies for rights violations that the Court provides
under the Charter. Again, we will return to Peterborough (City) v.
Ramsden240 to illustrate our point. As discussed above, the Court in
Peterborough affirmed its earlier decision in Committee for the Com-
monwealth ofCanada v. Canada241 that governments, unlike private
actors, have obligations under section 2(b) in relation to the property
they own. The real effect of that decision will, of course, depend upon
237 ld., at 327.
238 (1993]1 S.C.R. 897 at 911.
23' See Glenn, "The Supreme Court, Judicial Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions'
(1994), 28 V.B.C. L. Rev. 193 at 193,
:uo (1993) 2 S.C.R. 1084.
2" [1991]1 S.C.R. 139.
the availability of public property to individmils who wish to engage
in expressive activity. Yet public space increasingly is being priva-
tized, meaning there are fewer and fewer sites where section 2(b)
places obligations on property owners. 'Ib take one example, many
airports in Canada have been privatized and, according to the 1995
federal budget, privatization is the fate of all airports. After privati-
zation, leafletting in an airport, the activity protected in Common-
wealth, may no longer be protected under section 2(b) from
restrictions by the airport's owner since that owner will no longer be
government. The privatization of space is a trend that goes far
beyond airports: Public streets and town centres are giving way to
privately owned malls as primary sites of social interaction in subur-
ban and ex-urban population centres. In urban centres, enclosed
skyways, tunnel systems and sidewalks, often privately owned, are
the analogue of suburban malls. Moreover, many of the open spaces
in the urban core - "public" squares, parks and gardens - are
under the democratically unaccountable control of private owners.
Needless to say, the right to freedom of expression on public property
is dependent upon there being public property, and the rights created
by Peterborough likely will disappear, along with public property
itself, if the privatization trends ofneo-liberalism continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have argued that four distinct visions of the Canadian state
run through the Court's constitutional discourse this Term. 'Ib return
to the point we made in our introduction, we want to emphasize the
relationship between these conceptions of the state and the Court's
attempts to legitimate its decisions. Given the precarious position in
which courts in liberal democracies are put by the institution ofjudi-
cial review, it would be astonishing if judicial assumptions about the
nature of the state did not figure as important analytical themes in
these judgments. By invoking anyone of these images of the state,
the members of the Court can be seen as attempting to ground their
decisions in what they perceive to be the social consensus on any
particular issue. These images can all potentially serve this legiti-
mation function by representing distinct, yet coexisting, elements of
the political and legal traditions from which our dominant political
culture is constituted. The imagery of a state restricted from public
reordering of the private sphere, a state whose purpose is the allevi-
ation of disadvantage, a state rapidly rendered obsolete by the inter-
nationalization of capital, or a state whose jurisdiction is divided
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between different levels of domestic government, all ring true at dif-
ferent levels ofthis culture, despite the contradictions between them.
The Court, by invoking anyone of these images when making a par-
ticular decision, calls on an aspect of the dominant discourse that
gives its decision a general and accepted grounding, thus helping to
dull any contentious edges the decision might have. The existing mix.
of dominant views of the state will therefore shape the range of
images available to the judiciary for its justificatory discourse and,
thus, the decisions it reaches. If the last few years have seen domi-
nant views shifting toward the right of the political spectrum in Can-
ada and elsewhere - as the state gives in more and more to the
ideological pressures of capital and individualism, and as the legiti-
macy of the welfare state diminishes - one might expect that future
decisions of the Court will reflect this trend.
